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Vstříc vědecké metafyzice

100%
EN
The review article refl ects on Vladimír Havlík’s book Hierarchical Emergent Ontology and the Universal Principle of Emergence (Filosofia, 2021). It notes the key argumentative procedures and implications of the author’s arguments. It evaluates the various elements of hierarchical emergent ontology and compares them with classical proponents and critics of emergentism, especially Paul Humphreys and Jaegwon Kim. The study reconstructs Havlík’s universal principle of emergence and notes its application in selected scientific fields (fermions, cellular automata and neural networks). It takes a polemical approach to the advocated concept of scientific metaphysics.
CS
Recenzní studie refl ektuje knihu Vladimíra Havlíka Hierarchická emergentní ontologie a univerzální princip emergence (Filosofia, 2021). Všímá si klíčových argumentačních postupů a implikací argumentů autora. Hodnotí jednotlivé prvky hierarchické emergentní ontologie a srovnává je s klasickými zastánci i kritiky emergentismu, především s Paulem Humphreysem a Jaegwonem Kimem. Studie rekonstruuje Havlíkův univerzální princip emergence a všímá si jeho uplatnění ve vybraných vědních oblastech (fermiony, buněčné automaty a neuronové sítě). Polemicky se staví k obhajované koncepci vědecké metafyziky.
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85%
Forum Philosophicum
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2008
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vol. 13
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issue 1
17-29
EN
Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.
3
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Irreducible Holism

85%
EN
This paper explores some issues concerning the relation between ontological reduction and conceptual reduction, as construed by the physicalists. More specifically, it aims at highlighting and analyzing certain general methodological and ethical implications of the physicalistic research projects. Against this background, the paper identifies a certain category of concepts as “irreducibly holistic”, that is, those with regard to which ontological and conceptual reduction are inextricably bound together. Further, the paper argues that since irreducibly holistic concepts are conceptually irreducible to the physical, they have to be ontologically irreducible to the physical as well, thus rendering physicalism false. This conclusion is reached by analyzing and then rejecting a variety of programmes aimed at accommodating irreducibly holistic concepts within a physicalist framework (including eliminativism, preservative irrealism and quasi-realism). Lastly, an ontologically pluralistic framework is proposed for the purpose of reconciling apparently conflicting insights from different areas of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
EN
This paper challenges Daniel Dennett’s attempt to reconcile the performance of mind and brain within a physicalist framework with Jaegwon Kim’s argument that a coherent physicalist framework entails the epiphenomenalism of mental events. Dennett offers a materialist explanation of consciousness and argues that his model of mind does not imply reductive physicalism. I argue that Dennett’s explanation of mind clashes with Jaegwon Kim’s mind-body supervenience argument. Kim contends that non-reductive physicalism either voids the causal powers of mental properties, or it violates physicalist framework. I conclude that Dennett’s account of mind does not escape or overcome Kim’s mind/body supervenience problem. If Kim’s argument does not prove Dennett’s explanation of mind to be either a form of reductive materialism, or a logically inconsistent view, it is due to the ambiguity of concepts involved in Dennett’s theory.
5
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Superweniencja psychofizyczna

80%
EN
The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.
PL
The article presents a survey of the fundamental theory of consciousness according to David Chalmers. In order to examine these issues the following actions are taken. In the first part, the philosophical and cognitive-scientific views of David Chalmers are summarized in detail. Particular attention is paid to the following issues: the distinction between the easy and hard problem of consciousness, the nature of qualia, supervenience, as well as the arguments against the reductive accounts of consciousness. The elements of the structure of Chalmers’ fundamental theory: e.g., the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance and the principle of double aspects of information are presented. Also, the problems of the relationship between mind and quantum mechanics are analyzed. In the second part, Chalmers’ theory of consciousness is challenged and criticized in three areas: cognitive science, philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. In the summary, the reply to the question in the title of the article is suggested.
EN
Emergetism is a theory which explains the mechanism of evolutionary development of nature by stipulating that in complex natural systems on the higher levels of complexity there appear some functions and properties that can not be reduced to and accounted for by functions and properties of the lower levels of complexity. It is therefore the theory of emergence – which stands for some special way the complex systems arise (emerge) from a multiplicity of their relatively simply components. The idea of evolutionary emergentism appears in the philosophical writings of Joseph Życiński in the context of a discussion on the possibility of creating a interpretation of evolutionary processes in which biological theory of evolution could be combined in a coherent way with a theological doctrine about God, the creator of the universe. This paper presents the main ideas and opinions Życiński formulated about this theory; the first part of it contains some basic characterization of emergetnism, the second one compares the notions of emergence and of supervenience; the third one concerns some theological interpretation of this two notions.
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71%
PL
Roger W. Sperry (1913–1994) received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of mind-body (mind-brain) interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states.
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