The paper concerns an attempt to determine the status of European Union member states. It takes as its starting point the statement that the EU’s organizational structure provides for more than a confederation of states but less than a federation. At the present stage of the EU’s development a unique organization has been established that has not predecessor in the standards of international organizations. This is accompanied with a new approach to the interpretation of the nature of sovereignty of integrating European states, which is connected with intensifying processes of decomposition and the loosening of sovereign control by states over their territories and populations. States achieve their sovereign interests within the framework of international structures. They can also voluntarily restrict their sovereign rights on the basis of the commonly accepted rules and principles of international organizations. In this way they assign a comparative degree of state authorities’ competencies to these organizations. As a consequence, numerous issues that were formerly regulated by states are increasingly more often solved by means of corporate operations. This naturally leads to the states’ opening to the international environment without any threat to their sovereignty. The process of integration in Europe has not resulted in sovereignty of the European Union itself. Sovereignty remains an attribute of states. European states maintain their ability to
In The Law of Peoples – published in Poland for the first time twenty years ago – John Rawls extended his theory of justice to the field of international relations. The philosopher developed the concept of the law of peoples, or the political concept of justice that applies to the norms and principles of international law and practice. As part of his concept, Rawls proposed a vision of human rights as rights that define the limits of state sovereignty. In the article, in addition to a synthetic overview of Rawls’s concept of human rights, I present selected critical arguments, formulated by John Tasioulas, Charles Beitz, James Nickel, Allen Buchanan, Martha Nussbaum, and Thomas Pogge. In the second part of the text, I discuss an attempt to defend Rawls’s views, proposed by David Reidy and Samuel Freeman. In conclusion, I summarize both lines of argument, presenting my own position.
PL
W Prawie ludów – wydanym w Polsce po raz pierwszy 20 lat temu – John Rawls dokonał rozszerzenia swojej teorii sprawiedliwości na grunt stosunków międzynarodowych. Filozof rozwinął koncept prawa ludów, czyli politycznej koncepcji sprawiedliwości, która ma zastosowanie do norm i zasad międzynarodowego prawa i praktyki. W ramach swojej koncepcji J. Rawls zaproponował wizję praw człowieka jako uprawnień, które wyznaczają granice suwerenności państw. W artykule, obok syntetycznego omówienia autorskiej koncepcji praw człowieka J. Rawlsa, przedstawiam jej wybraną krytykę, sformułowaną przez Johna Tasioulasa, Charlesa Beitza, Jamesa Nickela, Allana Buchanana, Marthę Nussbaum oraz Thomasa Poggego. W drugiej części artykułu prezentuję próbę obrony stanowiska Johna Ralwsa, którą zaproponowali David Reidy oraz Samuel Freeman. W zakończeniu dokonuję podsumowania obu linii argumentacyjnych, przedstawiając własne stanowisko.
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