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Sur la tendance analytique du polonais

100%
Lingua Posnaniensis
|
2010
|
vol. 52
|
issue 1
39-54
EN
The article discusses W.V.O. Quine's critique of the classical distinction 'analytic vs. synthetic sentences'. The author claims that the debate concerning this distinction is essential for semantic and lexicographic analysis, which nowadays must face certain well known metaphysical problems. She discusses five strategies of argumentation formed against Quine's position, inluding four explicit definitions of analyticity. The author claims that A. Bogusławski's (1998) definition seems to be the most effective one, and the same time closest to Kant's approach. This definition can be adopted in order to verify claims on the analyticity of propositions which include two predicates under discussion.
EN
Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. Their criticism has, however, a different character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot define it in a satisfactory way. Quine’s criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious from the scientific point of view. This general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for different reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion — a model which is based on false analogies. In my text, I compare these two approaches and point out that they have different metaphilosophical sources. The main difference lies in the fact that, according to Austin, statements about linguistic meaning usually have a descriptive character, whereas Quine claims that linguistic meanings are theoretical entities. In the last part of my article, I discuss the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and assess its credibility, as it plays a key role in Quine’s criticism of the notion of meaning.
EN
This work starts with the premise that the Albanian language is one of most ancient languages in the world and stands in the root of the common trunk of the Indo-European languages. The common pre-Indo-European origin is preserved in the present Albanian language almost in the same conditions that this language was spoken 2-3 thousand years ago. Further in the work arguments are set forth regarding Albanian language priorities as a synthetic-analytic type language and the role of the Albanian language as the key in analyzing the Indo-European language system is presented. Regardless the tendencies toward analytic features the Albanian language, at the same time, preserves also useful elements from the synthetic features. Continuing, the Albanian language geopolitical positioning is presented from the point of view of the Indo-European languages differentiation and concentration in the EU context and Euro-Atlantic countries integration, supposing the conditions of each language in relation to the specific way of thinking in that language. Closing, some concrete examples are presented about where and how the different ways of thinking may be applied and harmonized, either with the synthetic or analytic domination, and a concrete example is analyzed about how Albanian language can be invested in the improvement of the Indo-European linguistic system, drawing some conclusions in this direction.
EN
This paper addresses the issue of stipulation in three cases of implicit definitions (postulates of scientific terms, systems of axioms and abstraction principles). It argues that the alleged implicit definitions do not have a purely stipulative status. Stipulation of the vehicles of the implicit definitions in question should end up with true postulates. However, those postulates should not be taken to be true only in virtue of stipulation since they have extra commitments. Horwich’s worry emerges in all three kinds of implicit definitions under consideration, since the existence of meanings so that the alleged postulates are true depends on extra requirements that should be fulfilled. Moreover, if Ramseyfication method is applied to the three kinds of implicit definition, they are split up into two components from which the first one is broadly factual while the second one is purely stipulative. The paper argues that their definitional task in each case should be assigned to their second component i.e. their Carnap-conditional.
PL
Prezentowany artykuł porównuje Kanta i Lotzego koncepcję sądów syntetycznych a priori. Celem Lotzego jest odnowienie rozwiązań Kantowskich, co zostaje osiągnięte dzięki wprowadzeniu dystynkcji pomiędzy analityczną (identyczną) treścią, a syntetyczną formą tych sądów, które Kant uznał za syntetyczne. Dystynkcja ta umożliwia stworzenie koncepcji intencjonalnego sensu mającej duży wpływ na Fregego i Husserla
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