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EN
The author of the present study is particularly interested in the a priori epistemology “shown” by the German philosopher, which is the heart of the transcendental method both for Kant and for the Marburg philosophers. In the context of Stammler’s philosophy of law it is essential first of all from the point of view of the structure of the a priori concept of law that presents the fundamental issue for the study of his formal philosophy of law.
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EN
The article elucidates and assesses the Marburg School’s account of the cognition. The characteristic feature of epistemology from this School is the rejection of the mirroring and acceptance of the cognitive transformation. The criticism of the mirroring theory is implicitly contained in Paul Natorp’s and Hermann Cohen’s cognitive relationism. Ernst Cassirer articulated this critical epistemology in his philosophy of the symbolic form and his conception of the symbolic representation. The historical bases of this criticism has been reconstructed as a main purpose of this article.
EN
The article presents Paul Natorp's social theory in relation to sources of culture. Bearing in mind symptomatic features of evolutionary thinking of the transcendental thought of Marburgian thinker, the question of the moral idea that becomes a reflection of the philosophically developed system of social pedagogy (Sozialpädagogik) becomes a forgotten issue of the moral idea. The article also shows how Natorp – using the differentiation of nature and culture – engages in the process of justifying pedagogy the Gesetzwissenschaften-area (logic, ethics, aesthetics), identifying philosophical pedagogy with science and at the same time the art of ethical human formation in the practice of responsible education and teaching.
EN
The relationship between psychology and philosophy is one of the most important problems of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, in which it reveals itself twice. It is the first time in the post-Kantian philosophy and is associated with such thinkers as Jakob Friedrich Fries, Friedrich Eduard Beneke, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Jürgen Bona Meyer. The second time in the late nineteenth century, when the problem of psychologism arises. Apart from pointing out the radical antipsychology of the Marburg Neokantian School, there are two controversies. The first one is a discussion between Wilhelm Dilthey and Hermann Ebbinghaus, the second one is a criticism of psychologism by Edmund Husserl. This is interesting because Husserl's understanding of psychology is directly related to his reference to the representative of the Marburg School, Paul Natorp.
EN
The article discusses the position taken by the neokantian Marburg School against the epistemological claim of psychologism, which localized the ultimate source of knowledge and its proof of validity in psychological realm. Marburg School opposed strongly against psychologism to such an extent that 'antypsychologism' itself became one of the most prominent features of the 'Marburg School doctrine'. Antypsychologism served both as a negative point of reference for the transcendental method developed and practiced by the Marburg School, and as an exemplary determinant which distinguished that specific tradition from other neokantian schools. According to Cohen's, Natorp's and Cassirer's critique, psychologism conceived the whole problem of cognition in a very limited sense and reduced all the cognitive acts to the acts of consciousness; psychologism deemed it is necessary that all the cognitive acts have to be conscious, therefore treated consciousness as a necessary condition of all cognitive operations. Exponents of the Marburg School, most notably Ernst Cassirer, did not seek to get rid of psychology at any cost from the edifice of scientific knowledge, but simply to put is in its right place and to separate 'science of the contents' from the 'science of the forms' of knowledge. The latter was supposed to become a fundamental subject of interest for the critique of epistemology developed by the Marburg School as a strictly philosophical science. Its task was to deduce from any systematically developed domain of knowledge its logical structure and to show constitutive for the object of the given science pure cognitive functions, which are independent from the psycho-physiological constitution of the subject of cognition.
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