Search results

1

State Autonomy in Shaping Tax Policies: Facts and Myths Based on the Situation in OECD Countries

100%

Tomkiewicz J., Postuła M.

Central European Management Journal

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2020

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vol. 28(2)

83-97

EN

Purpose: Capital flows, tax competition, multinational companies and tax havens weakens governments’ ability to lead independent tax policy. This race to the bottom, especially in the case of CIT rate, seems to work. Aim of the text is to show that the governments are not as powerless as it is often claimed. Despite common opinion, nation-states retain a relatively significant autonomy in creating their own fiscal policies, including tax instruments. Size of funds kept in tax havens have not been growing for few years and international cooperation of tax authorities is more and more efficient in dealing with the tax fraud. Methodology: The study uses desk research method for theoretical reasoning to verify the research hypothesis. Moreover, the study seeks answering if the application of EU tax policies determines national tax policy. To that end, the authors utilize time series and cause-effect analysis, as well as quantitative research for the systematization of statistical information and regression analysis for the examination of statistical dependencies. Tax competition or the functioning of tax havens naturally limits the realization of the fundamental functions of fiscal policies, although the taxation remains one of the most crucial instruments of macroeconomic and income policy of national authorities. Findings: The most important data on public revenues structure in different OECD countries indicate that taxation remains one of the most crucial instruments of macroeconomic and income policy of national authorities. We also show that impact of FDI on hosting economy is not as positive as it is said to be. There is no relation between FDI and R&D spending and level of wages in hosting country is even affected in the negative way by the FDI inflow. Irrespective of the regulatory details introduced at the EU level – the basic factor affecting jets coordination in the field of cooperation between tax services brings effects both in terms of the current collection of tax liabilities and the creation of regulations that hinder tax avoidance and under statement assessment. Originality/value: The study focuses on an analysis of tax policy. The view that taxation of international corporations is fraught with difficulties finds support in the undeniable reality of tax competition.Moreover, a large and growing share of profits is transferred to low-tax places. The prospects for taxing international companies with positive rates seem unoptimistic. Therefore, it is essential to check how the national economy is affected by the FDI inflow in OECD countries.

2

The Fiscal Union as a Remedy For the Economic and Financial Crisis in the European Union

100%

Gałuszka J.

Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy

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2013

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vol. 8

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issue 1

49-67

EN

Financial crisis and a global deep recession has led to new government interventions, and the nation's governors have struggled with the resulting budget deficits, unemployment, and other economic problems in their states. Many states are facing major fiscal problems in coming years. Rising debt and growing health and pension costs threaten tax increases down the road. At the same time, intense global economic competition makes it imperative that states improve their invest-ment climates. To that end, some governors are pursuing broad-based tax reforms, such as cutting income tax rates and spending restraint to get their states back on track. The purpose of the article is to identify the impact of globalization and the international environment on the process of tax harmonization in the EU from the perspective of proposal to establish a fiscal union. Moreover, I would like to answer whether a deeper fiscal harmonization will help to achieve the objectives of fiscal consolidation in the time of global tax competition and free movement of capital, goods, services and labour force. The article is divided into several small parts. These parts include the examples/small case studies, which would help stressing the pros and cons of fiscal union and its potential consequences also in the field of economic freedom. Methodology in the article is based on the descriptive analysis of statistical data, source materials and Polish and English literature.

3

Zmiany struktury obciążeń podatkowych w państwach unii europejskiej w okresie kryzysu a przewidywania teorii konkurencji podatkowej

100%

Kudła J.

Nauki o Finansach

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2014

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issue 3(20)

11-27

EN

The article verifies the impact of economic variables on the tax burden in the European Union countries, which took place in period 2006-2011. We concentrate especially on compatibility with the predictions of some theories of international taxation. The confirmation of selected predictions should allow for the better understanding of the mechanisms behind the observed tax adjustments and to construct new theoretical models better fitted to the observations. We especially test for example: the hypothesis of tax competition in traditional form and with agglomeration effects, compensation hypothesis, hypothesis of tax export and fiscal solvency hypothesis. The main results confirm the impact of the crisis on the increase of the capital and labor tax burden. However, this effect has not led to the significant growth of the tax revenues. It stipulates that the situation of each country is more relevant for the explanations of the results than the weakening or strengthening of tax competition during the crisis.

4

Spatial interdependence in property taxation: the case of Polish municipalities

88%

Małkowska A., Telega A., Głuszak M., Marona B.

Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy

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2018

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vol. 13

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issue 2

265-283

EN

Research background: Real estate and urban economics literature are abundant in studies discussing various types of property taxes and their characteristics. A growing area of re-search has been focused on tax equity, tax competition, and yardstick competition, where the latter two reflect the idea of tax mimicking. Recently, due to substantial developments in spatial and regional economics, more attention has been drawn to spatial effects. Empirical results are focused on spatial interaction and diffusion effects, hierarchies of place and spatial spillovers. Property tax system in Poland differs from those utilized in the majority of developed countries. As a consequence, property tax policy at the local government level (including tax competition and tax mimicking effects) in Poland can differ substantially from those found in previous research in the US and other European countries. There are few studies addressing the problem of tax competition and tax mimicking in Poland from an empirical perspective. Purpose of the article: In the article, we explore spatial interdependence in property taxation. We identify clustering or dispersion of high and low values of the tax rates within major metropolitan areas in Poland. The effects can indicate the presence of tax mimicking among municipalities in given metropolitan areas. Methods: We analyze the data from 304 municipalities in 10 metropolitan areas in Poland from the year 2007 to 2016. The data covers four property tax rates: (1) on residential buildings (2) on buildings used for business purpose (3) on land used for business purpose (4) on land for other uses. To explore the spatial distribution of rates, we used global and local spatial autocorrelation indicators (Moran's I statistic and LISA). Findings & Value added: The results suggest the presence of spatial correlation within metropolitan areas. We also found significant differences between metropolitan areas. The results of the study fill the gap in empirical research concerning property tax interdependencies and tax mimicking in Poland.

5

Opodatkowanie dochodów przedsiębiorstw w państwach OECD – kierunki ewolucji

75%

Mazurek-Chwiejczak M.

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H – Oeconomia

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2016

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vol. 50

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issue 1

EN

Corporate Income Taxes are considered to be harmful to the economic growth – their burden generates high deadweight loss. The constructions of Corporate Income Taxes in OECD countries are determined by two material factors: before 2009 it was international tax competition, and after 2009 – public finance imbalance. The article is devoted to the evolution of corporate income taxation. It contains the analysis of fiscal efficiency of the category of taxes and the analysis of nominal CIT rates.

PL

Podatki obciążające dochody przedsiębiorstw są uznawane za jedne z najbardziej szkodliwych dla wzrostu gospodarczego. Przed 2009 r. reformy podatkowe w tym obszarze determinowane były przede wszystkim międzynarodową konkurencją podatkową, zaś po tej dacie – nierównowagą finansów publicznych, jaka dotknęła większość krajów OECD na skutek dekoniunktury gospodarczej. Artykuł przedstawia ewolucję podsystemu opodatkowania dochodów przedsiębiorstw, w tym w szczególności analizę wydajności fiskalnej tego typu danin oraz wysokości stawek Corporate Income Tax - zasadniczej konstrukcji funkcjonującej w ramach omawianego podsystemu.

6

Tax Competition as a Challenge to the Governance of Global Economy

75%

Penttilä S., Kultalahti J., Penttilä S. S. o. M., Kultalahti J. S. o. M., Penttilä S. s. p. u. f., Kultalahti J. j. k. u. f.

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2012

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vol. 19

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issue 2

EN

The paper analyses the role of tax competition in global economy. How can tax systems respond to the challenge - by international cooperation or by national rules, by tax harmonisation or by tax competition? In this paper we approach the question as a matter of global governance. Tax competition is seen both as a means and as an object of global governance. Our conclusion is that there is no universal answer to the question: competition or harmonisation? Attempts to govern the processes of global economy on a national level may easily lead to tax competition. On the other hand, at least at the supranational level, i.e. at regional or global level, the goals and mechanisms of governance seem to emphasise harmonisation. Nowadays especially the OECD has become an important actor or forum for cooperation in taxation. It has succeeded in many ways in preventing and reducing harmful tax competition. The soft law mechanisms developed by the OECD have often been converted into the hard law mechanisms on national level. The governance activities have been based on both soft law and hard law mechanisms.

7

Stawki podatków dochodowych od osób fizycznych i prawnych w krajach Unii Europejskiej i wybranych rajach podatkowych a bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne

63%

Działo J.

Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne

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2014

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vol. XCIII (93)

139-155

XX

Tax competition is defined as the use of tax policy that will allow to maintain or increase the attractiveness of a particular territory for business location. Tax competition is used especially by the relatively under-developed countries, as foreign capital inflow gives them the possibility to implement modern technology, new management methods or to increase exports. One of the effects of tax competition is the formation of tax havens, countries or territories using preferential tax rates in order to gain capital from abroad. Comparative analysis of the income tax rates in the EU countries and certain tax havens shows that despite the progressive reduction of the rates of these taxes in the EU, the phenomenon of tax competition is still very strong, and the position of tax havens as countries with relatively low or very low taxes seems to be unthreatened. Conducted empirical studies, however, show that tax competition does not significantly affect the volume of foreign direct investment, and the amount of the nominal rate of corporate income tax is not critical to the decision of potential investors. Favorable investment climate is not determined only by the properties of the tax system, but it also depends on other factors. Therefore relatively highly developed countries should increase their efforts to intensify competition for capital through the use of factors other than low taxes, for example political stability, relatively low labor costs, transparent and unambiguous legislation supporting the development of business, simple procedures to enable start a business and promoting the development of entrepreneurship, good cooperation with local and central authorities, the development of road infrastructure and telecommunications / internet, highly skilled workforce and quality of land for investment.

8

Optymalna struktura podatkowa w warunkach konkurencji międzynarodowej. Analiza symulacyjna

63%

Kudła J., Kocia A., Kopczewska K., Kruszewski R., Walczyk K.

Przegląd Zachodniopomorski

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2013

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issue 3/2

231-245

EN

The paper addresses the problem of international tax competition in a coexistence of: capital, labor and consumption taxation. We allow for the possibility of capital gains shifting abroad and for the different levels of capital ownership. On this basis, the optimal taxation conditions were derived. Generally, in the case of low capital-marginal–productivity-elasticity, for given level of tax consumption burden, the capital should be subsidized and the labor should be taxed positively. If we exclude the subsidies for capital then the taxation of labor becomes sensitive to both the size of the consumption tax and the level of international income shifting.

9

Lokalna konkurencja podatkowa w Polsce

63%

Swianiewicz P., Łukomska J.

Studia Regionalne i Lokalne

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2016

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issue 2(64)

5-29

PL

Artykuł stawia pytanie o przydatność koncepcji konkurencji podatkowej do analizy lokalnej polityki podatkowej w Polsce. Koncepcja ta była stosowana z powodzeniem do analiz prowadzonych w innych krajach europejskich, ale jak dotychczas nie była systematycznie testowana w Polsce. Dyskutowane są dwa warianty konkurencji: klasyczna (o mobilną bazę podatkową) oraz porównawcza, w której przedmiotem konkurencji jest kapitał polityczny władz podtrzymywany (lub zdobywany) w wyniku porównania stawek podatkowych z gminami sąsiednimi. Ze względu na wielkość i charakter podatków lokalnych testowana jest hipoteza o większym znaczeniu konkurencji porównawczej. Artykuł rozpatruje też kwestię regionalnego zróżnicowania konkurencji podatkowej, stawiając hipotezę, że na natężenie tej konkurencji ma wpływ wielkość pomostowego kapitału społecznego. Wyniki przeprowadzonego badania potwierdziły przydatność koncepcji konkurencji podatkowej dla wyjaśniania różnic w polityce realizowanej przez poszczególne gminy.

EN

The paper considers the usefulness of the tax competition theory for the analysis of local tax policies in Poland. The concept has been successfully used for analyses conducted in several European countries, but it has not been systematically tested in Poland yet. There are two types of competition discussed in the paper: classic competition for mobile tax base and yardstick competition, in which local politicians compete for political capital related to a comparison of tax rates with neighbouring municipalities. Due to the limited size and types of local taxes in Poland, it is expected that yardstick competition is more important than classic competition for mobile tax base. The paper also examines regional variation in the intensity of local tax competition, and it formulates the hypothesis that it is more visible in regions with higher bridging social capital. Results of the conducted research indicate that the theory of local tax competition is a useful concept helping to explain the variation in tax policies among Polish municipalities.

10

International tax competition versus optimisation strategies adopted by holding companies in tax havens

63%

Gajewski D. J.

Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego

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2021

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issue 11

2-7

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu jest przedstawienie zjawiska międzynarodowej konkurencji podatkowej, które wiąże się z kształtującymi się politykami podatkowymi państw. Szczególnie istotne jest odróżnienie omawianego zjawiska od szkodliwej konkurencji podatkowej. W ramach opracowania odniesiono się do rajów podatkowych, które mają istotny wpływ zarówno na międzynarodową, jak i na szkodliwą konkurencję podatkową. Na międzynarodową konkurencję podatkową wpływają również holdingi międzynarodowe, które w ramach swoich strategii podatkowych wykorzystują liczne instrumenty z zakresu inżynierii podatkowej. Niniejszy artykuł wskazuje najistotniejsze, ale i najbardziej aktualne z nich. Opracowanie przedstawia również, jak na międzynarodową konkurencję podatkową oddziałują kształtujące się relacje i powiązania zachodzące pomiędzy państwami będącymi rajami podatkowymi (ale nie tylko) a holdingami międzynarodowymi.

EN

The subject-matter of the article is presentation of the phenomenon of international tax competition which is related to the developing tax policies of countries. It is particularly important to distinguish the phenomenon under discussion from harmful tax competition. In the course of elaboration, it is necessary to mention tax havens that exert a substantial influence both on international and harmful tax competition. Holding companies also influence international tax competition as they adopt numerous tax engineering instruments within the framework of their tax strategies. The present article indicates the most important as well as the most up-to-date ones. The elaboration also presents how the relations and links that are being shaped between countries that are tax havens (though not only) and international holding companies impact international tax competition.

11

Internal tax competition: does this result in economic and investment growth?

63%

Paientko T., Oparin V., Sarnetska Y.

Nauki o Finansach

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2020

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issue vol. 25, nr 1

23-34

EN

The purpose of the article is to assess the impact of tax competition at national level on economic growth and capital formation. The internal tax competition was considered from the point of view of fiscal decentralisation. The tax revenue decentralization ratio and revenue decentralization ratio are used in this paper as independent variables in panel regression analysis. As dependent variables, GDP per capita growth and capital formation growth were used. Analysis was conducted on a sample of 26 countries. The results of the analysis showed that international tax competition between countries has a greater effect on GDP per capita and capital formation than tax competition within the country. However, this is not due to the nature of tax competition, but to the fact that not all countries use the potential of tax competition within the country. The direction for further research is to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on the effectiveness of governments and economic growth in different groups of countries.

PL

Celem tego artykułu jest ocena wpływu konkurencji podatkowej na poziomie krajowym na wzrost gospodarczy i akumulację kapitału. Wewnętrzna konkurencja podatkowa została rozpatrzona z punktu widzenia decentralizacji fiskalnej. Współczynnik decentralizacji dochodów podatkowych oraz współczynnik decentralizacji dochodów są wykorzystywane w artykule jako niezależne zmienne w analizie regresji panelowej. Jako zmienne zależne stosuje się wzrost PKB na mieszkańca i wzrost nakładów inwestycyjnych. Testy przeprowadzono na próbie 26 krajów. Wyniki analizy wykazały, że międzynarodowa konkurencja podatkowa między krajami ma większy wpływ na PKB na mieszkańca i nakłady inwestycyjne niż konkurencja podatkowa w kraju. Nie wynika to jednak z charakteru konkurencji podatkowej, ale z tego, że nie wszystkie kraje wykorzystują potencjał konkurencji podatkowej w tym kraju. Perspektywą dla dalszych badań jest analiza wpływu decentralizacji fiskalnej na efektywność rządów i wzrost gospodarczy w różnych grupach krajów.

12

Tax Competition Or Tax Coordination? What Is Better For The European Union? / Konkurewncja Podatkowa Czy Koordynacja Podatków? Co Jest Lepsze Dla Unii Europejskiej?

63%

Działo J.

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2015

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vol. 18

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issue 2

37-55

EN

Tax competition is defined as the use of tax policy that will allow to maintain or increase the attractiveness of a particular territory for business location. Tax competition is used especially by the relatively under-developed countries, as foreign capital inflow gives them the possibility to implement modern technology, new management methods, or to increase exports. One of the effects of tax competition is the formation of tax havens, i.e. countries or territories offering preferential tax rates in order to gain capital from abroad. A comparative analysis of the income tax rates in the EU countries and certain tax havens shows that despite the progressive reduction of the rates of these taxes in the EU, the phenomenon of tax competition is still very strong, and the position of tax havens as countries with relatively low or very low taxes seems to be unthreatened. The question arises whether tax competition is a real problem for the EU Member States and if there exist arguments for tax harmonization, or at least tax coordination within the EU countries. The discussion in this paper suggests that the arguments for tax coordination in the EU are not yet strong enough. However, both tax competition and tax coordination have their supporters and opponents.

PL

Konkurencja podatkowa to stosowanie takiej polityki podatkowej, która pozwoli na utrzymanie lub zwiększenie atrakcyjności danego obszaru dla lokalizacji inwestycji. Konkurencja podatkowa stosowana jest zwłaszcza przez kraje stosunkowo słabo rozwinięte, gdyż napływ kapitału zagranicznego daje im możliwość wdrożenia nowoczesnych technologii, nowych metod zarządzania i zwiększenia eksportu. Jednym ze skutków konkurencji podatkowej jest powstawanie rajów podatkowych, krajów lub terytoriów korzystających z preferencyjnych stawek podatkowych w celu pozyskania kapitału z zagranicy. Analiza porównawcza stawek podatku dochodowego w krajach UE i niektórych rajach podatkowych pokazuje, że pomimo stopniowego obniżania stawek tych podatków w UE, zjawisko konkurencji podatkowej jest nadal bardzo silne, a pozycja rajów podatkowych jako terytoriów oferujących relatywnie niskie stawki podatkowe wydaje się być niezagrożona. W tym kontekście powstaje pytanie, czy konkurencja podatkowa jest prawdziwym problemem dla państw członkowskich UE oraz czy istnieją argumenty przemawiające za harmonizacją lub przynajmniej koordynacją podatków w krajach UE. Rozważania prowadzone w niniejszym artykule wskazują, że argumenty za wprowadzeniem koordynacji podatków w UE nie są jeszcze zbyt silne. Zarówno konkurencja podatkowa, jak i koordynacja podatków mają swoich zwolenników i przeciwników.

13

Holding company location: a Polish tax perspective

63%

Jamroży M., Janiszewska M., Łożykowski A.

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

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2023

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vol. 85

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issue 1

239-260

PL

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wielkości i struktury płatności pasywnych, takich jak dywidendy, odsetki, opłaty licencyjne oraz należności za usługi niematerialne, dokonywanych przez spółki holdingowe mające siedzibę w Polsce. W artykule sformułowano hipotezę, że jurysdykcje podatkowe oferujące rozbudowane zachęty prawno-podatkowe dla struktur holdingowych, w szczególności dotyczące podatkowego traktowania dywidend i innych płatności opodatkowanych u źródła, są preferowanym miejscem lokalizacji holdingów. Przegląd literatury oraz analiza źródeł prawa poprzedzają analizę empiryczną. Z przeprowadzonej analizy empirycznej wynika, że płatności pasywne, w tym dywidendy, odsetki, opłaty licencyjne czy za usługi niematerialne, które stanowią dominujący typ płatności do spółek holdingowych, kierowane są z Polski przede wszystkim do krajów o „przyjaznych” rozwiązaniach podatkowych i regulacyjnych dla holdingów, w tym w szczególności do tzw. wewnątrzunijnych rajów podatkowych, czyli Luksemburga, Cypru, Niderlandów, Malty i Irlandii. Realna wymiana handlowa z tymi krajami nie jest ani znacząca, ani współmierna do skali płatności pasywnych.

EN

This paper aims to present the size and structure of passive income payments, such as dividends, interest, royalty payments, and fees for intangible services, made by companies domiciled in Poland belonging to a multinational enterprises (MNE) group. The authors formulate a hypothesis that tax jurisdictions offering extensive legal and tax incentives for holding structures, in particular concerning the tax treatment of dividends and other withholding tax payments, are the preferred location of holding companies. A review of the literature and legal sources precedes empirical research. The empirical analysis shows that passive income flows, including dividends, interest, royalties, and fees for intangible services, which constitute the dominant type of payments to holding companies, are directed from Poland primarily to countries with tax and regulatory solutions that are friendly to holding companies, including in particular the so-called intra-EU tax havens, namely Luxembourg, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Malta and Ireland. Real trade with these countries is neither significant nor proportional to the scale of passive income.

Refine search results

State Autonomy in Shaping Tax Policies: Facts and Myths Based on the Situation in OECD Countries

The Fiscal Union as a Remedy For the Economic and Financial Crisis in the European Union

Zmiany struktury obciążeń podatkowych w państwach unii europejskiej w okresie kryzysu a przewidywania teorii konkurencji podatkowej

Spatial interdependence in property taxation: the case of Polish municipalities

Opodatkowanie dochodów przedsiębiorstw w państwach OECD – kierunki ewolucji

Tax Competition as a Challenge to the Governance of Global Economy

Stawki podatków dochodowych od osób fizycznych i prawnych w krajach Unii Europejskiej i wybranych rajach podatkowych a bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne

Optymalna struktura podatkowa w warunkach konkurencji międzynarodowej. Analiza symulacyjna

Lokalna konkurencja podatkowa w Polsce

International tax competition versus optimisation strategies adopted by holding companies in tax havens

Internal tax competition: does this result in economic and investment growth?

Tax Competition Or Tax Coordination? What Is Better For The European Union? / Konkurewncja Podatkowa Czy Koordynacja Podatków? Co Jest Lepsze Dla Unii Europejskiej?

Holding company location: a Polish tax perspective