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EN
Reality in cinema can be considered its fulfillment (in the causal sort of way), and at the same time the impossibility of its fulfillment (within the teleological framework). This notion is confirmed by the variety of film realisms that exist, and also within a more general, aesthetic perspective by the susceptibility of realism to ideological appropriation. The fulfillment of reality in cinema is above all tied up with its anthropological consequences: a meaningful experience of film within existence marked by lack of teleology and the contemplation of the world as an element of understanding and taming of reality. At the same time the impossibility of the fulfillment of cinema in the reality is associated with the ability to overcome the sharpness or harshness of reality, which also addresses an important anthropological need.
EN
This article is an attempt at analysing educational issues from the perspective of teleology. Teleology is a sub-discipline of philosophical and religious reflection. Providing a purpose is a fundamental act of humans. This type of reflection is also needed in education. The article presents four possible types of relations between philosophy and religion in culture. These various possibilities result in various solutions that can be employed in upbringing. Depending on the adopted system of values, a young person will have a different vision of the world. The article also provides a historical analysis, referring to various classical philosophical and religious systems.
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Why Is Plato’s Good Good?

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The form of the Good in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic seems, by our standards, to do too much: it is presented as the metaphysical principle, the epistemological principle and the principle of ethics. Yet this seemingly chimerical object makes good sense in the broader context of Plato’s philosophical project. He sought certain knowledge of necessary truths (in sharp contrast to the contingent truth of modern science). Thus, to be knowable the cosmos must be informed by timeless principles; and this leads to teleology and the Good. The form of the Good, it is argued, is what makes the world knowable insofar as it is knowable. This interpretation plugs a significant gap in the scholarship on the Good and draws attention to a deep connection between Plato’s epistemology and his teleological understanding of the cosmos.
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Summary. John Ray was primarily interested in his work as a naturalist. However, prompted by his conscience and the sense of his priestly obligation, he authored three books of religious character: one on physico-theology, one on sacred physics, and one on practical theology. The article presents some of his views expressed in these books.
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Outside institutionalised environmental activities, we find that individual efforts to combat environmental damage are at risk of succumbing to resignation. For her reflections on ‘green fatigue’ the author borrowed economist Alberta O. Hirschman’s psychological concept of the potential for disappointment. Whether and to what extent an individual is able to withstand failure depends on one’s mental fitness, the degree of support received from one’s social group, and historical and other circumstances. This article considers the proposition that the potential for disappointment largely hinges on what a person’s motivation is to engage in environmentally-oriented behaviour. The author works with a typology of motivations derived from categories of normative ethics: teleological and deontological ethics and virtue ethics. The article first describes these motivational types on a general level and then examines them in relation to environmentalism. The findings of this study may have practical as well as theoretical significance: environmental problems cannot be tackled solely through technical and scientific efforts founded on goal-directed, teleological motivations, as these are at risk of succumbing to disappointment and fatigue. Environmental problems must be approached from a broad humanistic perspective, as it is on that level that the ethics of environmental virtue take shape and deontological motivations are reinforced – two approaches that are not grounded in great expectations and are thus relatively resistant to disappointment from negative environmental development and provide a basis for effective goal-directed behaviour.
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Changing Kinds: Aristotle and the Aristotelians

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Aristotle is routinely blamed for several errors that, it is supposed, held 'science' back for centuries - among others, a belief in distinct, homogenous and unchanging species of living creatures, an essentialist account of human nature, and a suggestion that 'slavery' was a natural institution. This paper briefly examines Aristotle's own arguments and opinions, and the perils posed by a contrary belief in changeable species. Contrary to received opinion even amongst some of his followers, Aristotle was not a species essentialist and his ethical theory, properly expanded, provides arguments against bioengineering human and other species without a clear view of what should count as beauty.
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This paper discusses metathesis and other related processes attested in the North Mazovian dialects of Polish. Recently proposed functional approaches to sound change provide a framework for this analysis. It is argued that the transposition of segments with elongated phonetic cues is best analyzed as an instance of phonetically-based sound change. Copying a consonant across a rhotic finds a similar perceptual explanation involving the reinterpretation of the acoustic signal. In addition to perceptual metathesis, I consider cases that fall under coarticulatory metathesis and arise from varying degrees of gestural overlap. In comparison to previous approaches to metathesis, the role of syllable structure in driving metathesis is considerably diminished but not refuted. Structural optimization presumably operates in tandem with phonetic and perceptual factors. Language processing is called to attention in accounting for the long-distance transposition of similar segments. A connectionist approach that makes reference to activation and competition in a neural network of linguistic units is invoked to define this type of metathesis. On the whole, the Polish dialectal data support the hypothesis that sound change is fundamentally diachronic and non-optimizing.
EN
In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17–21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one.
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In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17– 21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one.
EN
Robert Spaemann is one of the leading contemporary philosophers whose thought is focused on Christian ethics. Despite his bonds with the Catholic Church he does not use philosophy to “prove” a doctrine but proposes individual ideas avoiding reductions. His reflections on people’s naturalness and historicity, teleology, paradoxicality of science do not lead to simple solutions but are the consequence of participation in the society of contingency. The authoress of this sketch considers if Spaemann’s thought could be inspiring for non-Catholics, as well as ponders over its connections with postsecularism, working out the modernity in respect of religiosity. This article shows what appears from his interpretations to the critical members of (post)modern society and where today is a place for heading for “the immortal rumor”. The authoress explains how Spaemann argues for the potential of anthropomorphic view and human ability to go beyond himself – which does not lead into nothingness.
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Stemming from the general postcolonial theoretical tradition, the concept of self-colonisation proposed by the Bulgarian scholar Alexander Kiosev has proved inspiring to Polish scholars. This article attempts to examine more closely Kiosev’s meandering self-reflective musings on what he called his “metaphor” of self-colonization, an idea he ultimately rejected in view of the undesirable ressentiment it tends to produce. By illustrating the historical and cultural background underpinning the concept of self-colonisation I seek to identify the roots of potential intercultural misunderstanding. Above all, I focus on the consequences of the teleological approach inherent in Kiosev’s concept. Those are expressed in identifying manufactured (sic!) origins with an account which can be couched in the language of a politically and therapeutically conditioned method of research. This leads to a symmorphic deformation of those origins, aligned to the requirements of the modern world.
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The aim of the present article is to consider the shortcomings of the physicalist rainfall example set forth by Aristotle in Physics II.8. I first outline the ancient physicalist account of the coming-to-be of natural organisms and the accompanying rejection of the teleological character of such processes. Then I examine the rainfall example itself. The fundamental difficulty is that rainfall does not appear to have a proper nature. Hence it is not natural in the strict sense and cannot be used in arguments either for or against natural teleology. Rainfall can at most have an end in a weak sense, which makes it inadequate as a paradigm. Furthermore, the physicalist conception of action for an end is itself flawed. I argue that they construe it anthropomorphically and falsely presuppose a symmetry between coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. I would like to thank Hasse Hamalainen and Marcin Karas for looking at earlier drafts of this paper. I am also especially grateful for the numerous remarks and suggestions of three anonymous referees
EN
One of the constitutional moments of the structure of kinesthesia—that is the mo-tions of the body—is the practical orientedness of motions towards something. In this article I will deal with this structural moment in the practical life of the subject. I will first differentiate between teleology in the instinctive movements of the body and the intentionality in the practical activities of the subject. Whereas the former refers to the primary and instinctive orientedness of the bodily motions toward something generally determined fulfilling the instinctive needs of the body, the latter is to be understood as the pre-reflexive orientedness of the bodily motions toward a goal in the practical sphere of subject-life. At the end I will examine Husserl’s idea of the universal teleolog-ical structure of reason, which has its roots in the primary instinctive life of the subject.
Open Theology
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2014
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vol. 1
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issue 1
EN
This paper argues that Hume’s claim to have some belief in God is accurate because his own philosophy is held together by a teleological underpinning that leads to the idea of God. Previous work that has favorably connected Hume’s philosophy to Kant’s provides a framework to argue that Hume inadvertently admits a teleological a priori in understanding nature in the same way that Kant understands teleology as the “lawfulness of the contingent.” Having connected Hume and Kant through teleological aesthetics, this paper moves to show how this teleology underwrites several positive statements about God that Hume makes in the Dialogues.
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Defending the ancient thesis, that being and the true, or being and manifestation, are necessarily inseparable, is at the heart of transcendental phenomenology. The transcendental “reduction” disengages the basic “natural” naïve doxastic belief which permits the world to appear as essentially indifferent to the agency of manifestation. The massive work of transcendental phenomenology is showing the agency of manifestation of “absolute consciousness.” Yet the foundations of this agency of manifestation are pervaded by issues which, when addressed, reveal that the question of a “second absolute” is basic and opens Husserlian phenomenology to metaphysical questions. This has to do not merely with the teleology of the agency of manifestation, i.e., the “whither” of the teleology of presencing, but also, in some sense, with the constituting “whence” of the transcendental I. Husserl argues for the teleology of truth pointing to both a divine subject as well as a divine entelechy.
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Transcendental Phenomenology of language wrestles with the relationship of language to mind’s manifestation of being. Of special interest is the sense in which language is, like one’s embodiment, a medium of manifestation. Not only does it permit sharing the world because words as worldly things embody meanings that can be the same for everyone; not only does speaking manifest to others the common world from the speaker’s perspective; but also speaking, as a meaning to say, may achieve the manifestation of the world also for the speaker herself. This requires finding the right words to form true propositions in a well-formed sentences. The manifest telos of proposition-rendering sentences is adumbrated and founded in the infant’s elemental formation of simple phonemic identity syntheses and syntax. This instinctual dynamism is founded in what Husserl names “the idea of truth” which supports the thesis of a universal language instinct.
EN
In this paper I propose to show: 1) that in Phys. II 8 Aristotle takes Empedocles as a paradigm for a theoretical position common to all philosophers who preceded him: the view that materialism implies a mechanistic explanation of natural becoming; and 2) that, since Empe­docles is regarded as a philosopher who clearly expresses the position of all mechanistic materialists, Aristotle builds his teleological arguments precisely to refute him. Indeed, Aristotle believes that refuting the argu­ments of Empedocles – the champion of mechanism – means refut­ing the mechanistic theory itself. In order to illustrate this point, I will discuss some passages from Phys. II 8, while also turning to consider the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s Physics. I will then endeav­our to explain why in 198b19 ff. Aristotle formulates the argument of rain, which has attracted so much attention from scholars of the Phys­ics: I will consider whether Aristotle believes that rain serves a purpose, contrary to what he claims with regard to meteorological phenomena in Meteorologica.
EN
The aim of this text is to consider whether the meaning of life and purpose of life is the same. These philosophical investigations assume axiological objectivism, which claims two things: 1) values are a characters or qualities of objects, 2) phrases like ‘X is good’ are sentences in logical sense. As the main methods used in investigations was conceptual and linguistic analysis, which have been used to characterize the notion of ‘life’ and ‘meaning’. This step allowed to precise notion of ‘meaning of life’ and allowed to consider the titled question. Result is negative: meaning of life is based on values, and not on arbitrarily taking purposes. If meaning of life is a some kind of essential good, then purposes cannot make life meaningful, if themselves are not valuable.
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The article presents the problem of self-commitment as the foundation of one’s identity. It refers to the conceptions of Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard to expose the role of norms in shaping one’s identity. However, it stresses the fact that the process of self- constitution as a result of self-commitment needs also a teleological frame. Self-commitment requires an aim to explain why it is worth undertaking it. Kant’s teleology can be found in his humanism while Korsgaard’s teleology in her identifications with norms. They both seem to understand humanity as a value and an end. Hence humanity appears as the sources of obligation and motivation. Understanding humanity as a value makes self-commitment not only possible but also meaningful.
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My aim is to assess an argument against final causation being an irreducible metaphysical category. The argument in question is based upon the supposition that for anything to count as a cause, it must exist at the very moment of executing its causal action, which requirement can supposedly never be met by anything rightly pretending to be called a final cause. I argue that this argument is far from conclusive as there seem to be ways of blocking it - namely through adopting either a version of the eternalist ontology of temporal dimensions, or else a version of the possibilist ontology, each combined with either a version of the "Humean" approach to analysis of causal relations, or else with a version of the realist approach to causation.
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This paper presents the way in which Hans Driesch’s experiments in embryology led him to the metaphysical concept of entelechy. The author shows the way of considerations of Driesch from his early reductionism standpoint until to reception, by him, metaphysical concept of entelechy.
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