In the article the author presents the genesis and evolution of the research on strategic culture. He also conducts an analysis of the conditions and factors shaping the Polish strategic culture and the role of the Polish national security strategy in it. Attempts are also made to evaluate the Polish strategic culture, with an emphasis on the perception of the role of military forces in it. The main research problem is as follows: Is strategic culture really present in Poland and what were the conditions for its development? Specific questions to be answered are: What has characterized strategic culture in Poland? What factors have determined the shape of Polish strategic culture? What is its impact on foreign policy and Poland’s security? How are armed forces perceived in Polish strategic culture? The main conclusion is that Poland has its own strategic culture, which has been shaped by historical experience.
Zakres i intensywność współpracy między RFN i Ukrainą, mimo dużych oczekiwań i nadziei wyrażanych przede wszystkim przez stronę ukraińską, w pierwszych dwóch dekadach XXI wieku nie osiągnął zbyt wysokiego poziomu. Władze niemieckie nie tylko nie wypracowały w tym okresie jasno sprecyzowanej koncepcji politycznej wobec tego kraju, ale stały się nawet jednym z głównych zwolenników realizacji zasady Russia First. Konieczność uwzględnienia przez Berlin przesłanek determinowanych znaczeniem Moskwy dla europejskiego i światowego bezpieczeństwa jest stałym czynnikiem warunkującym pozycję Niemiec w kwestii rozszerzenia NATO o Ukrainę, bez uwzględnienia którego nie można w sposób właściwy zdiagnozować dynamiki relacji niemiecko-ukraińskich. Stanowisko Berlina w tej kwestii charakteryzuje wyraźnie niezmiennie negatywne podejście. Podczas trwającego od 2014 r. rosyjsko-ukraińskiego konfliktu zbrojnego Ukraina nie doczekała się zarysowania jasnej perspektywy członkostwa. Co więcej, w istniejącej sytuacji kwestia ta traktowana jest jako czynnik budujący dodatkowe napięcia i tym samym uniemożliwiający dyplomatyczne przezwyciężenie kryzysu. Tego rodzaju podejście, w warunkach prawdopodobnej permanentności konfliktu, oznacza nie tylko realne zdjęcie kwestii rozszerzenia Sojuszu na Wschód z euroatlantyckiej agendy, ale prawdopodobnie również długotrwałe jej „zamrożenie”.
EN
The scope and intensity of cooperation between Germany and Ukraine, despite high expectations and hopes expressed primarily by the Ukrainian side, have not reached high level in the first two decades of the 21st century. During this period, the German government has not only failed to develop a clear political concept for Ukraine, but became one of the main supporters of the Russia First principle. Berlin’s need to take into account the conditions determined by Moscow’s significance for European and global security is a constant factor determining Germany’s attitude towards NATO’s enlargement to Ukraine without which the dynamics of German-Ukrainian relations cannot be properly understood. Berlin’s attitude towards this issue has been clearly and consistently negative. During the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, ongoing since 2014, Ukraine has not seen a clear membership perspective. Moreover, in the current situation, this issue is treated as a factor creating additional tensions and thus blocking the diplomatic routes to overcome the crisis. Such an approach, coupled with the probable permanence of the conflict, means that the enlargement of NATO to the East will probably not only be removed from the Euro-Atlantic agenda, but also “frozen” for a long time to come.
The article is devoted to the development of Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in the second decade of its existence. The Corps, which is based in Szczecin, has been operating since 1999 as a part of NATO’s military structures. The Corps was created by three founding countries: Denmark, Germany and Poland. In accordance with the Convention of September 5th, 1998, the aim of the corps is to plan and carry out activities for the benefit of collective defense purposes under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to participate in multinational missions and military operations. Between 2004 and 2015, the Corps was joined by other countries as “participating members”: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (2004), Slovakia and the Czech Republic (2005), United States of America (2006), Romania (2008), Slovenia (2009), Croatia (2012), Hungary (2013), Sweden (2014), and the UK (2015). In the second half of 2015 the corps was extended with the representatives of the Armed Forces from Turkey, France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Finland. The Corps headquarters in Szczecin is organized according to NATO standards. It includes the Command Group (rotationally manned by personnel from Demark, Germany and Poland) and nine functional divisions. Military units that function under the authority of the Corps (70–100 thousand soldiers) are deployed in their bases in the founding states. Up until now, the soldiers from the Corps has participated in 3 ISAF missions in Afghanistan. Decisions to strengthen signifi cantly the force of the Corps were made on 4–5 September 2014 during the NATO Summit in Newport. During the summit, the founding states also decided to raise the level of combat readiness of the Corps. Since then, the Corps has been undergoing another transformation, the most important one since its inception. In NATO, it is assumed that at the end of 2016 the Corps will reach its full readiness to command various military formations of the Alliance, including: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), NATO Response Force (NRF), and also NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. This implies the need for further infrastructure development of the Corps and the increase of the scope of its responsibilities in the field of allied defense. This task was regarded as a priority before the next NATO Summit scheduled for 8–9 July 2016 in Warsaw.
After 2011, Polish-German military cooperation has gained a new momentum. It is carried out on both bilateral and multilateral basis within NATO, EU and the Weimar Triangle framework. The scope of the cooperation covers principally the sphere of defense, but excludes the creation of security processes on a global scale. The question of the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union in the field of providing safety and security is also present in the cooperation. This applies especially to the functioning of NATO as a defense alliance and the EU as an institution responsible for emergency response management. Strictly military sphere of cooperation, however, consists mainly in the exchange of information related to the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces and the Bundeswehr, as well as in the exchange of experience related to the organization of the national defense system.
PL
Polsko-niemiecka współpraca wojskowa nabrała nowej dynamiki po 2011 r. Jest prowadzona zarówno w układzie bilateralnym, jak i multilateralnym w ramach NATO, UE i Trójkąta Weimarskiego. Jej zakres skoncentrowany został w sferze obronności, a nie kreowania procesów bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze globalnym. Obecna jest w niej także kwestia aktywności Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego i Unii Europejskiej w obszarze zapewniania bezpieczeństwa. Odnosi się to zwłaszcza do funkcjonowania NATO jako sojuszu obronnego i UE jako instytucji podejmującej działania w zakresie reagowania kryzysowego. Natomiast na sferę kooperacji stricte wojskowej składa się głównie wymiana informacji na temat funkcjonowania Sił Zbrojnych RP i Bundeswehry oraz wymiana doświadczeń związanych z organizacją systemu obronnego państwa.
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