Search results

1

Response to “Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist” by Piotr Bylica

100%

Harris M.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

|

2016

|

vol. 13

267-273

EN

In this paper, I respond to a recent published analysis of my work by Dr Piotr Bylica, which characterises me as a “naturalistic theist”. I suggest that Bylica’s analysis takes this approach in order to fit my thought into his own “levels of analysis” scheme, but that it does not accurately represent my own theistic beliefs. I further argue that this process has resulted in the loss of important nuances in my work on areas such as miracles, dualism, and biblical interpretation.

2

Two criticisms of natural theology

100%

Gębura B.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

|

2014

|

issue 54

127-154

EN

The article aims at considering two general criticisms often formulated against the natural theology. First criticism is based on the thesis that the conclusions of the natural theology are not adequate with the religious beliefs of non-philosophers. It is widely known as opposition between God of Religion and God of Philosophers. One can find that argument in the writings of Blaise Pascal. I’m arguing for the thesis, that the natural theologian cannot fulfill the criteria given by the proponents of this argument. This is because the argument of the natural theology cannot contains the premises taken from the Revelation. If the argument of the natural theology would contain the premises taken from the Revelation, then it would be the argument of religion. But philosopher of religion (natural theologian) can’t do this, if he wants to formulate an philosophical argument. The second criticism is based on the notion of a rational person. In the light of this argument, the natural theology is successful only, if every rational person will accept the conclusion “God exist”. I’m trying to show that there is no philosophical argument that can guarantee it’s acceptance by some rational persons. The acceptance of the conclusion of the argument of the natural theology is a matter of personal decision. There is no logical argument, which can “force” rational persons (rational subjects) to accept it’s conclusion. But if this is true, the arguments for the existence of God are no worse than other philosophical arguments.

3

Użyteczność metod logiki nieformalnej w badaniu argumentów w dyskusjach między teistami a ateistami

89%

Trombik K.

Semina Scientiarum

|

2017

|

vol. 16

EN

This paper argues that methods used in informal logic (sometimes called CriticalThinking) could be helpful in examining the arguments in discussionsbetween theists and atheists. Application of the techniques of informal logiccould reveal the substantive value of many commonly shared views about theism(and theists) and atheism (and atheists). The utility of applying informallogic methods has illustrated by several examples.

4

Probabilistic theism and the problem of evil

88%

Łukasiewicz D.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

vol. 39

5-17

EN

I would like to present in the article an “omnipotence model of a theodicy of chance”, which is, as I believe, compatible with the view called probabilistic theism. I also would like to argue that this model satisfies the criteria of being a good theodicy. By a good theodicy I mean a reasonable and plausible theistic account of evil. A good theodicy should be: a) comprehensive, b) adequate, c) authentic and d) existentially relevant.

5

Second Thoughts on Naturalistic Theism and Model of Levels of Analysis: A Response to Mark Harris

75%

Bylica P.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

|

2016

|

vol. 13

275-285

EN

I shall show that Dr. Harris’ study of biblical scholarship is treated in a very serious manner in my paper, as it is the element identifying him as a representative of naturalistic theism (NT). NT is a position that has been recognized in the literature on science and religion for several years. Dr. Harris’ commitment to the rule of methodological naturalism in the natural sciences, as well as his lack of evidence for the limits of using it in his hermeneutical analysis of divine action, makes his academic papers represent the main assumptions of NT. Model of levels of analysis (MLA) helps to show the empirical character of accounts of divine action as an important part of the traditional theistic interpretation of this action, and scepticism towards such an interpretation as a main characteristic of all advocates of NT.

6

Role víry v prožívání smysluplnosti života u vysokoškolských studentů

75%

Křeménková L., Novotný J. S.

Psychologie a její kontexty

|

2015

|

vol. 6

|

issue 1

79-95

EN

Problem: The aim of this paper is to verify the existence of differences in experiencing life meaningfulness of believers and unbelievers and analyze how much faith affects life meaningfulness. Methods: The sample consisted of 213 university students aged 20-29 years (mean age = 23). Respondents were divided into three groups: Christians (N = 80), Buddhists (N = 25), atheists (N = 108). We used a Existential Scale (ES) questionnaire, 46-item tool, detecting a subjective measure of personal meaningful existence in two dimensions: Personality (sub-dimensions Self-distance and Self-transcendence) and Existentiality (sub-dimensions Freedom and Responsibility). Data were analyzed using SPSS. Results: Using independent t–test, it was confirmed that life meaningfulness was significantly lower for unbelievers in dimension Personality, t(180,943) = 7,013), p < ,001 (this represented a strong effect, d = ,983) and ES Total Score, t(175,424) = 4,201, p < ,001 (this represented a medium effect, d = ,592). Subsequent independent one-way ANOVA (using Welch F) indicated that believers demonstrate a higher life meaningfulness in the dimensions Personality, F (2, 84,212) = 32,062, p < ,001, Self–distance, F (2, 69,585) = 8,556, p < ,001, Self–transcendence, F (2, 79,331) = 26,058, p < ,001, and in ES Total Score, F (2, 74,285) = 9,133, p < ,001. A post hoc Games–Howell indicated that believers (Christians and Buddhists) scored significantly higher in Personality (strong effect, ?2 = ,23), Self-transcendence (strong effect, ?2 = ,19), Self-distance (medium effect, ?2 = ,07), and ES Total Score (medium effect, ?2 = ,07) than atheists. In Personality and Self–transcendence Buddhists also scored significantly higher than Christians. A linear regression was further performed. The faith (Christianity and Buddhism) was a significant predictor of life meaningfulness in ES Total Score, dimension Personality and its sub–dimensions. The religion explains 7,6% (R2 = ,076) of ES Total Score variance, 18,7% (R2 = ,187) of Personality variance, 16,9% (R2 = ,169) of Self–transcendence variance, and 6,9% (R2 = ,069) of Self–distance variance. Finally, we analyzed the influence of gender on the relationship between faith and life meaningfulness. A Pearson correlation explored the relationship between faith and life meaningfulness. This analysis was found to be statistically significant in dimension Personality, r(209) = ,433, p < ,001, and ES Total Score, r(209) = ,276, p < ,001, indicating a strong positive relationship. This relationship was then subjected to a first-order partial correlation in order to explore the relationship controlling for the effects of social support. The first-order correlation was found to be statistically significant in dimension Personality, r(209) = ,432, p < ,001, and ES Total Score, r(209) = ,278, p < ,001, indicating that gender doesn’t affect a relationship between faith and life meaningfulness. Discussion: Analysis confirmed the differences in life meaningfulness depending on faith and corresponds with the results of earlier studies (cf. Mahoney & Grace, 1999; Fromm, 2001; Halama, Martos & Adamová, 2010; Yalom, 2006). Faith seems to facilitate understanding of one’s own world as meaningful, and through religious dogma, traditions and rules provides a firm meaningful life framework. Higher scores of meaningfulness at Buddhists can be explained by the fact that Buddhism compared with Christianity more potentiates the possibility of self-development and a positive perception of the world. The influence of faith on the perceived life meaningfulness is however rather smaller, but still significant. This is consistent with previous studies (cf. Byron & Miller-Perrin, 2009). The biggest influence is evident in the dimension Self-transcendence. Faith, therefore, affects more emotional than cognitive aspects. This is consistent with the fact that faith is more a matter of the heart than sense, rather a kind of sensed, animistic beliefs than rational logical conclusions. The research has some limitations. The research sample consist of specific group of university humanities students. More general population may therefore produce different results. Also the concept of faith (religiosity) was measured in simplex way. For future research it would be desirable to accurately distinguish the different forms of faith (spiritual beliefs) and also monitor their intensity. This could provide further/ deeper insight into the issue of relationship between faith and life meaningfulness. Conclussion: Believers and unbelievers university students significantly differ in their experience of life meaningfulness, especially in the domain of Personality. The actual impact of the faith is not too large and ranges from 6,9 to 18,7% of the explained variance of meaningfulness. The research results and lack of studies on certain aspects of this issue indicate the need for further investigation of the topic.

7

Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist: The Perspective of the Model of Levels of Analysis

75%

Bylica P.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

|

2015

|

vol. 12

7-36

EN

Presently, naturalistic theism is the dominant position in the debate on the relation between science and religion, defending a thesis that the conflict between science and religion is only an apparent one. Also, this version of theism accepts the naturalist assumptions behind contemporary science and attempts to reformulate the beliefs held within the traditional Christian theism in order to present the religious view of reality as not conflicting with the scientific picture of the world. Certain assumptions behind Mark Harris’s views on the relations between science and religion can be described as consistent with naturalistic theism. The model of levels of analysis helps to analyze the most important themes found within naturalistic theism and show how these are described in the works of Harris. The model facilitates the identification of the relations between particular kinds of assumptions behind the position taken from the point of view of naturalistic theism in the debate on the relation between science and religion. The list of most frequently recurring assumptions — that are also important in Harris’s writings — include: the general division of epistemic competence, which assumes theology (religion) to be competent in dealing with the metaphysical issues (Levels 1 and 2) and science to be the only one competent to deliver the empirical statements describing processes and entities found within the empirical sphere (Levels 4 and 5); the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions behind contemporary science (Level 2) and skepticism toward the religious notions found in the traditional Christian theism describing supernatural interventions and toward the dualist interpretation of human soul (Level 3). This leads to the acceptance of purely scientific, naturalistic, explanations of the events found within the empirical sphere and to skepticism toward the literal meaning of descriptions of empirical events (Level 5) that are not consistent with the anti-interventionist assumptions behind science. Harris’s acceptance of naturalistic theism in terms of the relation between science and religion and his use of the techniques found in the modern biblical scholarship have led him to the ideas of plurality of meanings and the lack of one definite truth with respect to the specific issues he deals with. From the point of view of MLA it is the rejection of super-naturalistic assumptions of the traditional Christian theism and the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions of science that seems to be the cause of lack of definite truth in his theological explanations.

8

Can Causal Chains Extend Back Infinitely? Entailment, Determinism, and a Cosmological Argument

75%

Dumsday T.

Forum Philosophicum

|

2014

|

vol. 19

|

issue 2

193–208

EN

I develop a new argument to the effect that past causal chains cannot extend back infinitely, but must instead terminate in a first uncaused cause (or causes). It has the advantage of sidestepping a historically prominent objection to cosmological arguments of this general type, one leveled by Aquinas and various other Scholastics.

9

Reason and Faith

75%

Tałasiewicz M.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

|

2018

|

vol. 2

|

issue 1(3)

87–95

EN

The claim of this paper is that theism and atheism as beliefs about the nature of the universe are equally distant from any sort of proper justification by reasoning, but that faith cannot be reduced to any sort of belief (although it induces beliefs). This claim is illustrated by a survey of several case-studies, including the case of moral sense (Marc Hauser), the so-called “God gene” (Dean Hammer) and discoveries of Benjamin Libet on “free” movement. The illustrations attempt to show that only some imagerial associations connected with these cases, and respectively with religious beliefs, would make an impression of incoherence, not their actual content. The conclusion of the paper would echo the statements of Cardinal John Henry Newman, who said in his Oxford University Sermons: “Faith is an instrument of knowledge and action, unknown to the world before, a principle sui generis, distinct from those which nature supplies, and independent of what is commonly understood by Reason”. Some implications of this conclusion, such as the notion of the rationality of faith, an account of the relation between science and theology, or the problem of agnosticism, are discussed, too.

10

Jefte w tarapatach: Moralne dylematy a teizm

75%

Mann W., Iwanicki M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue 4

351-381

PL

Artykuł omawia zjawisko dylematów moralnych z perspektywy teistycznej. Teiści przyjmują często, że (1) opatrznościowy Bóg nigdy nie postawiłby stworzonej przez siebie istoty przed taką sytuacją wyboru, w której owa istota nie jest w stanie uniknąć czynu niesłusznego, bądź że (2) jeśli istota staje przed taką sytuacją wyboru, to jest to wynikiem pewnego niesłusznego działania, którego dokonała już wcześniej. Wielu komentatorów przypisuje tę drugą opcję Tomaszowi z Akwinu. Autor argumentuje, że taka interpretacja jest błędna, przytaczając między innymi przeprowadzoną przez Akwinatę analizę ślubowania Jeftego opisanego w Księdze Sędziów. Natomiast w odniesieniu do pierwszej opcji artykuł zamykają uwagi dotyczące sposobu opracowania normatywnej teorii etycznej o charakterze teistycznym, która uznaje istnienie dylematów moralnych. Teiści zainteresowani taką teorią powinni poważnie rozważyć odrzucenie założenia, że powinność implikuje możliwość.

EN

This essay examines the phenomenon of moral dilemmas from a theistic perspective. Many theists have supposed either (1) that a providential God would never confront a creature with a choice in which the creature cannot avoid doing wrong, or (2) that if a creature does confront such a choice situation, it is the result of some prior wrongdoing freely committed by that creature. This second alternative has been ascribed by many to St. Thomas Aquinas. I argue that the ascription is unwarranted, citing among other cases Aquinas’s examination of Jephthah’s vow in the book of Judges. As for the first alternative, the essay concludes with some observations about how one might develop a theistic normative ethical theory, consistent with God’s providence, that recognizes moral dilemmas. One of the assumptions that theists should seriously consider abandoning in the process is the principle that ought implies can.

11

The Idea of Miracle in the Enlightenment and Enlightenment in the Idea of Miracle: The Dialectics of Theological Narrative and Philosophical Discourse

75%

Bubnov E.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2021

|

issue 2

163-184

EN

The article is devoted to the problem of comprehension of the idea of miracle by the encyclopaedists and other enlighteners. The definitions of the concepts we use to designate the miraculous, the amazing and the magic change with the time. This fact may seem trivial at first glance. However, if we draw our sight to the material world we will see that the evolutionary changes taking place with some engineering devices do not affect the functions these devices were invented for. Entirely different is the situation with the semantics of some words denoting abstract concepts. The core function of the word is to convey a certain sense to the addressee. But, as may be seen from the speculations of the miraculous, it is the sense of the word which is gradually changing. The changes mentioned are due to the collisions between different world views at the turn of the epochs. However, the stereotype ideas of the Enlightenment as the period of fighting religious doctrines by means of applying to the reason as the only criterion of the truth, cannot be used to describe the processes in question. Our analysis will also point out at the problem of the periodization of the Age of Enlightenment.

12

Is Being a Good Empiricist the Same as Being a Good Naturalist? The Case of the Relationship Between Science and Christian Theism

75%

Bylica P.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

|

2023

|

vol. 20

|

issue 1

EN

Using Feyerabend's argumentation, and rephrasing of the problem in terms of the Model of Levels of Analysis, I show that a good empiricist need not be a (metaphysical or methodological) naturalist. I characterize the ideas of Alvin Plantinga and Jitse M. van der Meer as being representative of two different varieties of theistic response to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and contemporary science. Against van der Meer, I argue for Plantinga's conclusion about the value of theism-based science. Against both approaches, I point to situations where theistic assumptions do indeed influence the contents of observation.

13

Rozum wobec żałoby: argumenty apologetyczne C.S. Lewisa w obliczu dotkliwej straty. Część I: Rozum

71%

Bylica P.

Przegląd Religioznawczy

|

2019

|

issue 1/271

EN

Clive S. Lewis is thought to be one of the most important contemporary Christian apologist. In his works, Lewis argued against naturalism and put forward arguments in support of theism. In doing so, he referred to experience and made use of laws of logic and probabilistic reasoning, hence meeting rationality criteria. Part I discusses Lewis’s arguments from the existence of morality, reason, desires and numinous experiences. It presents a basal criticism of these arguments. Except of the ptresentation of those arguments and their analysis the aim of the paper is to provide a basis for a comparison (in Part II) of the anti-naturalistic arguments with what Lewis wrote about God, faith and life after death in the period following the passing of his wife, a great loss for the thinker.

14

Clive’a S. Lewisa argument z pragnień przeciwko naturalizmowi

63%

Bylica P.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

|

2020

|

vol. 56

|

issue 4

179-202

EN

This article outlines a number of formulations of C.S. Lewis’s anti-naturalistic argument from desire. We tackle the problem of the logical validity of this argument and its weak points as characterized in the relevant literature, including objections concerning the deceptive character of irrational factors such as emotions and desires. It is shown that the formulations of Lewis’s argument in which the anti-naturalistic conclusion does not deductively follow from the premises can still be considered as adding to our knowledge, when viewed as instances of inductive reasoning. There are also formulations of this argument that can be shown invalid only at the great cost of accepting the premise of the Universe as absurd. Lastly, the objection that Lewis’s reference to irrational factors weakens his argument is also rejected.

PL

W artykule przedstawione zostaną różne sformułowania argumentu z pragnień, wysuniętego przeciwko naturalizmowi, autorstwa Clive’a S. Lewisa. Analizie zostaną poddane zarzuty o brak logicznej poprawności jego wywodu oraz dotyczące zwodniczego charakteru czynników irracjonalnych, do jakich zaliczają się uczucia i pragnienia. Wykazane zostanie, że sformułowania, w których mamy do czynienia z brakiem konkluzywności antynaturalistycznego wniosku Lewisa, można jednak traktować jako poznawczo wartościowe, gdyż są one oparte na indukcyjnym schemacie wnioskowania. Istnieją natomiast sformułowania, które jedynie wielkim kosztem, jakim jest uznanie Wszechświata za absurdalny, można uznać za niekonkluzywne. Podejrzenie, iż odwołanie do czynników irracjonalnych osłabia argumentację Lewisa, okazuje się błędne.

15

Naturalistic theism on general divine action within the framework of the levels of analysis model

63%

Bylica P.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

|

2016

|

vol. 52

|

issue 4

7-37

EN

The model of levels of analysis (MLA) is used to describe naturalistic theism and compare statements describing divine action accepted within traditional Christian theism and naturalistic theism. The empirical/non-empirical character of the statements is the main criterion behind the division of the statements within the model. Naturalistic theism is divided into strong and weak, with the former being analyzed in more detail. Strong naturalistic theism is characterized as trying to avoid the conflict with science by only accepting statements describing general divine action in nature. Such statements belong to the metaphysical levels of analysis.

16

Lawina w omodlonym świecie – filozofia religii wobec przypadków Saula Smilansky’ego

63%

Wojtysiak J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2016

|

vol. 64

|

issue 1

61-73

PL

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi polemikę z esejem Saula Smilansky’ego pt. O wątpliwej warości moralnej pewnych rozpowszechnionych form modlitwy. Według Smilansky’ego niektóre modlitwy prośby, a zwłaszcza modlitwy o czyjeś dobra kosztem kogoś innego, są niemoralne. Zgadzam się, że nie każda modlitwa jest moralnie akceptowalna, lecz jednocześnie argumentuję, że jego uzasadnienie tej tezy zakłada lub zawiera fałszywe przesłanki. W szczególności formułuję cztery zastrzeżenia (lub zarzuty) wobec jego argumentu: (i) punktem wyjścia filozofii modlitwy powinny być nie prywatne przekonania filozofa, lecz (w przypadku braku empirycznej wiedzy o modlących się ludziach) ortodoksja lub ortopraksja określonej religii (zastrzeżenie metodologiczne); (ii) modląca się osoba (zwłaszcza w trudnej sytuacji życiowej) nie rozważa konsekwencji wysłuchania swej modlitwy (zastrzeżenie psychologiczne); (iii) zgodnie z modelem biblijnym każda modlitwa prośby zawiera warunek ‘jeśli Bóg chce’ (zastrzeżenie teologiczne); (iv) pomimo (reprezentowanej przez Smilansky’ego) powszechnej opinii, modlitwa prośby nie jest działaniem w zwykłym znaczeniu tego słowa (zastrzeżenie ontologiczne). Tej ostatniej tezy bronię, posługując się rozróżnieniem Charlesa Taliaferro na Świat Omodlony i Świat Nieomodlony. Poza tym próbuję podać własne kryterium moralności modlitwy prośby: modlitwa taka jest moralnie dobra, jeśli buduje pozytywną relację z Bogiem lub innymi ludźmi oraz jest wypowiadana wraz z uzupełnieniem ‘Boże, bądź wola Twoja!’

EN

The article is a polemic with Saul Smilansky’s essay “A Problem about the Morality of Some Common Forms of Prayer.” According to Smilansky some petitionary prayers, especially prayers for one’s own good at the expense of someone else, are immoral. I agree that not every prayer is morally acceptable but at the same time I argue that Smilanksy’s justification of this thesis presupposes or includes some false premises. In particular I give four reservations about (or objections to) his argument: (i) philosophy of prayer should start not with the private beliefs of the philosopher but (if one does not have empirical knowledge about praying people) with a given religious orthodoxy or orthopraxis (the methodological reservation); (ii) a praying person (especially in a difficult life situation) does not consider the consequences of his or her prayer’s being answered (the psychological reservation); (iii) according to the Biblical model every petitionary prayer involves the conditional clause ‘if God wills’ (the theological reservation); (iv) in spite of a common opinion (represented by Smilansky) petitionary prayer is not action in the ordinary meaning of this word (the ontological reservation). I defend the last thesis using Charles Taliaferro’s distinction between the Petitionary World and the Non-Petitionary World. I also try to introduce my own criterion of the morality of petitionary prayer: such a prayer is morally good if it builds a positive relationship between a petitioner and God or other people and if it is spoken together with the supplement ‘God, your will be done!’

17

The Clash of Theism and Liberal Individualism in Psychotherapy: A Case Illustration

63%

Slife B. D., Scott L., McDonald A.

Open Theology

|

2016

|

vol. 2

|

issue 1

EN

The present article extends the work of Allen Bergin by illustrating the therapeutic clash of liberal individualism and theism in an actual therapy case. As many scholars have demonstrated, liberal individualism has long been the “disguised ideology” at the assumptive base of many psychotherapy theories and practices. The case shows how the lead author was an “agent of culture,” to use Bergin’s terms, in his therapy with a Christian woman. It explains how he attempted to persuade her, without realizing it, to move from her basically Christian values to an individualist emphasis on happiness, instrumentalism, freedom from, autonomy, openness, and independence. Recommendations to deal with these issues are described.

18

Argumenty na nieistnienie Boga wobec teo-ontologii trynitarnej

63%

Strumiłowski J.

Analecta Cracoviensia

|

2016

|

vol. 48

EN

The analysis of arguments for non-existence of God shows, that they touch, on different levels, the metaphysical questions. Some of them assume openly another metaphysical model than that used by theists. The others seem to not touch directly the metaphysical questions, but they remain in another sphere, for example in the existential one. However, they also participate somehow in the metaphysics, which implies that they presume a specific image of God and a specific ontological model that differs very often from the theistic model.Nonetheless, even when the presumed metaphysics agrees with the theistic view, i.e. when the arguments are favourable for the philosophical Absolute, it does not mean that such arguments are also valuable in relation to one God in three Persons. The Trinitarian dogma describes the very essence of God, so it determines a specific metaphysical model in the creative model. Having in mind this relationship, the present article analyses the atheistic arguments in the light of theo-ontology, asking whether they fit to its model.

PL

Analiza poszczególnych argumentów na nieistnienie Boga pokazuje, że w różnym stopniu dotykają one kwestii metafizycznych. Niektóre wprost zakładają odmienny model metafizyczny aniżeli ten przyjmowany przez teistów. Inne wydają się nie dotykać wprost kwestii metafizycznych, a poruszają się w innej przestrzeni – na przykład egzystencjalnej. Jednakże i te w pewien sposób są zapośredniczone metafizyczne, przez co zakładają konkretny obraz Boga i konkretny model ontologiczny, który również często różni się od modelu teistycznego.Niemniej nawet w przypadku, kiedy przyjęta metafizyka i model Boga są zgodne z myśleniem teistycznym, tzn. kiedy argumenty są wymierzone w kierunku filozoficznego Absolutu, nie oznacza to, że owe argumenty posiadają swoje znaczenie także względem Boga Trójjedynego. Dogmat o Trójcy dotyczy istoty Boga, która determinuje w kontekście stwórczym konkretny model metafizyczny. Niniejszy artykuł wobec takiej zależności poddaje analizie argumenty ateistyczne w świetle teo-ontologii, pytając, czy mieszczą się one w jej modelu.

19

Bóg i antyrealizm

63%

Czerniawski K.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2014

|

vol. 62

|

issue 4

135-161

PL

Można wyróżnić dwa rodzaje powiązań między antyrealizmem semantycznym a teizmem. Pierwsze z nich ma swoje źródło w antyrealistycznym twierdzeniu, że język rozumiemy dzięki naszej znajomości uzasadnień sądów lub zdań. W konsekwencji tego staje się czymś niemożliwym przekazanie wiedzy Boga wierzącemu, jeżeli ten ostatni osobiście nie zna uzasadnienia odpowiedniego zdania. Ze szczególnie mocnym przedstawieniem tej doktryny mamy do czynienia na ostatnich stronach Logicznej podstawy metafizyki Michaela Dummetta. Można to rozumieć jako całkowite odrzucenie każdego rodzaju iluminacjonizmu, a także pewnych w jakiś sposób pokrewnych mu stanowisk, takich jak idealizm transcendentalny. Drugie powiązanie ma charakter bardziej pozytywny dla teizmu. Antyrealizm musi przyjąć, że każdy sąd może byś poznany, co wydaje się sprzeczne ze zdrowym rozsądkiem. Istnieje jednak prosty sposób na uczynienie tej sugestii czymś prawdziwym, a mianowicie przyjęcie istnienia wszechwiedzącego Boga, który zna każdy sąd. Ten sposób myślenia po raz pierwszy został wyeksponowany trzydzieści lat temu przez Alvina Plantingę i stał się przedmiotem szczegółowych dyskusji różnych filozofów. Należy podkreślić, że po szczegółowym zbadaniu te dwa rodzaje powiązań nie są równie mocno uzasadnione, ponieważ tylko pierwsze z nich jest silnie zakorzenione w antyrealistycznej semantyce, podczas gdy drugie jest jedynie pewną spekulatywną sugestią.

EN

Two kinds of connections between semantic antirealism and theism may be distinguished. The first one begins with the antirealist claim that we understand language through our knowledge of justification of statements or sentences. Consequently, it becomes impossible to transfer God’s knowledge to the believer, if she or he personally doesn’t know the justification of the relevant statements. There is especially strong exposition of this doctrine in the last pages of Michael Dummett’s The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. This could be understood as the refutation of any kind of illuminationism, as well as some remotely related positions, like transcendental idealism. The second connection is more positive for theism. Antirealism needs to suppose that every statement could be known, which seems to be contrary to common sense. But there is one very easy way to make this supposition true, namely by acknowledging the existence of omniscient God, who knows every proposition. This way of thinking was first expounded by Alvin Plantinga few decades ago, and since then has become the subject of scrupulous discussions by different philosophers. It should be emphasized that after close examination these two connections aren’t equally justified, because only the first one has strong semantic roots in antirealism, why the second one is merely a speculative conjecture.

20

TOMASZ Z AKWINU A TEISTYCZNY EWOLUCJONIZM

63%

Chaberek M.

Zeszyty Naukowe KUL

|

2016

|

vol. 59

|

issue 1

59-82

EN

“Thomas Aquinas and Theistic Evolution” is an article about the problem of using Aquinas’ thought to defend theistic evolution within the Christian theological tradition. The paper begins with definitions of terms such as “evolution” and “species.” The main part of the paper is structured according to the medieval articles written by Aquinas himself, such as those contained in his Summa Theologiae. First, the author presents twelve arguments that can be found in the writings of contemporary Thomists in favor of theistic evolution. In the next part, the author elaborates upon the answer to the question and he goes on to respond to the twelve arguments by referring to Aquinas’ writings. In the conclusion, the author shows seven points of disharmony between the three types of evolution (namely, atheistic, materialistic and theistic) and Aquinas’ teaching on the origin of species.

PL

Niniejszy artykuł porusza problem odwoływania się do nauczania św. Tomasza z Akwinu w obronie teistycznego ewolucjonizmu. Artykuł otwierają definicje pojęć takich jak ewolucja i gatunek. Główna część artkułu ma strukturę średniowiecznego artykułu, takiego, jaki stosował sam Akwinata np. w Sumie teologii. Najpierw autor przedstawia dwanaście argumentów, które można znaleźć w pismach współczesnych tomistów i innych filozofów w obronie teistycznego ewolucjonizmu. W drugiej części autor odpowiada na pytanie dotyczące kompatybilności nauczania Akwinaty z teistycznym ewolucjonizmem, a następnie rozwiązuje dwanaście trudności, odwołując się do tekstów św. Tomasza. W podsumowaniu autor przedstawia siedem punktów ukazujących niezgodność trzech typów ewolucji (ateistycznej, materialistycznej i teistycznej) z nauczaniem Akwinaty na temat pochodzenia gatunków.

Refine search results

Response to “Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist” by Piotr Bylica

Two criticisms of natural theology

Użyteczność metod logiki nieformalnej w badaniu argumentów w dyskusjach między teistami a ateistami

Probabilistic theism and the problem of evil

Second Thoughts on Naturalistic Theism and Model of Levels of Analysis: A Response to Mark Harris

Role víry v prožívání smysluplnosti života u vysokoškolských studentů

Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist: The Perspective of the Model of Levels of Analysis

Can Causal Chains Extend Back Infinitely? Entailment, Determinism, and a Cosmological Argument

Reason and Faith

Jefte w tarapatach: Moralne dylematy a teizm

The Idea of Miracle in the Enlightenment and Enlightenment in the Idea of Miracle: The Dialectics of Theological Narrative and Philosophical Discourse

Is Being a Good Empiricist the Same as Being a Good Naturalist? The Case of the Relationship Between Science and Christian Theism

Rozum wobec żałoby: argumenty apologetyczne C.S. Lewisa w obliczu dotkliwej straty. Część I: Rozum

Clive’a S. Lewisa argument z pragnień przeciwko naturalizmowi

Naturalistic theism on general divine action within the framework of the levels of analysis model

Lawina w omodlonym świecie – filozofia religii wobec przy­pad­ków Saula Smilansky’ego

The Clash of Theism and Liberal Individualism in Psychotherapy: A Case Illustration

Argumenty na nieistnienie Boga wobec teo-ontologii trynitarnej

Bóg i antyrealizm

TOMASZ Z AKWINU A TEISTYCZNY EWOLUCJONIZM

Lawina w omodlonym świecie – filozofia religii wobec przypadków Saula Smilansky’ego