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Challenges of liberalization. The case of Polish electricity and gas sectors

100%

Nowak B.

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

2009

vol. 2(2)

141-168

This paper applies the general insights of liberalization of the electricity and gas market to the market conditions of a particularly important new Member State in the EU, Poland. To this end the aim of this paper is to explain the Polish experience of liberalizing its energy market by reviewing those developments that produced its current shape. In fact there are two possible scenarios Polish policy makers can follow in liberalizing its energy sector. One would involve the UK approach that encompasses: ownership unbundling, less market concentration, less public ownership and more private capital in the industry. The second scenario follows the continental model: more concentration and vertical integration and more State or public ownership in the energy field (for instance, the French model). These two widely diverging approaches reflect different energy consumption patterns, energy mixes, sources of supply and natural resources of various countries. Having these differences in mind this research reviews developments that have produced the current state of liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors in Poland and discusses the prospects for further progress towards an integrated, competitive and liberalized European electricity and gas market in the light of the challenges that remain. These challenges include uneven unbundling, discriminatory third party access, insufficient independency of national regulator, consolidation and anti-competitive behaviour of incumbents or abuse of one’s dominant position on the market.

To regulate or not to regulate? – Economic Approach to Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU)

84%

Olender-Skorek M.

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

2012

vol. 5(7)

143-155

The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree, the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network, IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects will probably fail.

Le but de cet article est de présenter le droit irrévocable d’usage (IRU) comme un remède possible pour les projets d’infrastructure de télécommunications de l’UE qui, en Pologne, ont été lancés avec du retard. Grâce à l’IRU, les bénéficiaires de ces projets européens seront en mesure d’épargner à la fois le temps et l'argent pour terminer des projects avec succès. L'auteur décrit deux méthodes possibles de mise en œuvre de l'IRU: par l’obligation réglementaire et par le bias de bonne fois de l’opérateur historique. L'auteur propose un modèle de la théorie des jeux avec des gains qui dépendra de la stratégie choisie par le législateur et par l’opérateur historique. Par l'utilisation d'un arbre de la théorie des jeux, l'auteur montre que si seulement l’opérateur historique est prêt à offrir son propre réseau, l'IRU peut être signé, ce qui en effet aboutira à la disparition de la plupart des retards dans la mise en oeuvre des projets. Le succès n'est pas si évident dans le cas où la mise en œuvre de l'IRU est une obligation - là, les projets européens échoueront probablement.

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2 Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

1 2012

1 2009

1 Nowak B.

1 Olender-Skorek M.

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Challenges of liberalization. The case of Polish electricity and gas sectors

To regulate or not to regulate? – Economic Approach to Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU)