This article presents the results of examining selected factors co-occurring with high fertility rates in developed countries. Selected OECD countries at a similar stage of demographic development have been subjected to analysis. Employing cluster analysis, the selected developed countries have also been identified according to the type of adopted family policy. It has been found that the developed countries which spend more on the family policy concerning GDP are generally characterised by higher fertility rates than those which spend less. In the light of those findings, the family-policy expenditures which allow women to reconcile professional work with raising children turned out to be particularly important. The fertility rate has also been found to correlate with labour market rates, with the level of women’s professional activity in particular. Moreover, in the developed countries the relatively high fertility rate is accompanied by low rates of young people who do not work or attend school and are not in vocational training, as well as a high rate of extramarital births.
The fact that recent demographic data have been pointing to gradual but consistent dying out of Europe has become the key point of strong philosophical, political and other clashes in the last years. Most discussions focus especially on the issues related to the causes of this situation, thus rather omitting the real consequences on everyday lives of Europeans in the upcoming decades. Namely the economic and sociological impacts. The structure of population change in terms of nationality is the second important process in today’s Europe: The majority population comprising original nationalities on whose basis the state composition of Europe had been formed is gradually losing its dominance. Conversely, immigrants (particularly Muslims) and their children are gaining more and more influence on the structure of society. Various kinds of economic pressure are related to these processes, which in the future will inevitably grow into the shape of events completely changing the society and its economic system. I assume that in order to maintain its economic power, traditional European population will go through a process, during which some usual democratic principles and traditions will be put aside, for example the attitude towards the right to vote will change. That is because despite many complications, traditional European society will behave quite economically by keeping its political power as a guarantee of its economic power, and particularly as a guarantee that the standards of living and thus the possibility of satisfying one’s needs – manifesting itself through life style, among other things – will be preserved.
The article presents the results of the research on the age of newlyweds, the length of marriages, the number of children in the family and life expectancy for the magnate family in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 16th–18th centuries, and the comparison of those numbers with the parameters established by West-European historical demographers for aristocratic elites from Britain, France, Germany and Portugal and the families that ruled in Europe. The demographic parameters for the magnate family have been obtained from the database that contains information on particular genealogical facts such as the date of birth, marriage and death, and the number of children (collected in library and archival queries for nine families) and they have been compared with the results arrived at by West-European researchers. The results for the magnate family indicate that the average age of men who contract marriage for the first time is included between over 23 to over 27 years; that is also the age range when European aristocrats contracted marriages, but the average age approached the upper limit more frequently. The age at which women from magnate families contracted marriage for the first time also correlates with the data concerning European female aristocrats, that is to say between 18 and 23–24, and approaches the upper limit of the interval. In the case of other parameters the magnate family were of lower value. The length of marriage in magnate families was shorter than in England, the number of children in a family also was smaller, and life expectancy was usually shorter both for men and women. When we compare the data concerning magnate families with the analogous parameters concerning the West-European elites we can see that the magnate families from Lithuania were generally less healthy. The increase of nearly all the demographic parameters in the 18th century in their case was after all inferior to the ones referring to similar social groups in England and France. There is a possibility that difficulties connected with obtaining complete data and – as a result – a less numerous research sample, as well as taking into consideration only the children that had grown to the adult age (in the West-European samples all the children that had been born were counted) have influenced the values of the parameters and made them less reliable. That is why it is a need to continue the research and to concentrate on other problems (which are important from the point of view of functioning of the family), such as the size of definite celibate in the group in question, the percentage of second and third marriages, the problem of illegitimate children, etc.
This paper discusses the demographic potential of France in the late 20th and early 21st century. The research question concerning its demographic situation is answered through the in-depth description, analysis and assessment of the country's demographic resources in the period between 1991 and 2013, with respect to France excluding Mayotte or to metropolitan France. Due to the extensive and complex nature of the subject matter, the aspects of the demographic situation in France analysed in this paper have been chosen based on their relevance. Therefore, the paper consists of three main parts: population statistics and fluctuations in country's demographic structure, vital statistics (natality, fertility and mortality, excluding the question of marriages and divorces), as well as international migrations with a strong focus on the immigration to France. To sum up, the demographic situation in France is relatively optimistic when compared to other European countries (as exemplified by the rising total population figure, being the second most populated state in the EU, having positive natural increase rate and migration rate, approaching the threshold of generation renewal). The ageing of the population is one of the major demographic challenges for France; yet it is progressing at a slower pace than in the rest of Europe. Given its demographic situation, France actively seeks to define Europe-wide policy, for instance with respect to regulating international migrations.
PL
Przedmiotem rozważań w artykule jest potencjał demograficzny Francji na przełomie wieków XX i XXI. Odpowiedź na pytanie badawcze o sytuację demograficzną tego państwa zawiera się w pogłębionym opisie, analizie i ocenie jego zasobów demograficznych w latach 1991-2013, głównie w odniesieniu do części metropolitarnej. Z uwagi na szeroki i złożony zakres przedmiotowej problematyki, w artykule ograniczono się do analizy wybranych aspektów sytuacji demograficznej Francji, uznanych za szczególnie ważne i interesujące. W konsekwencji opracowanie składa się z trzech zasadniczych części, w których kolejno omówiono: bilans ludności i zmiany w strukturze demograficznej mieszkańców państwa, ruch naturalny ludności (urodzenia i płodność oraz umieralność, z wyłączeniem kwestii małżeństw i rozwodów) oraz migracje zagraniczne, z naciskiem na imigrację do Francji. Podsumowując, sytuacja demograficzna Francji jest relatywnie korzystna w porównaniu do innych państw europejskich (m.in. rosnąca ogólna liczba ludności, drugie miejsce w UE pod względem zaludnienia, dodatnie saldo naturalne i saldo migracji, zbliżanie się do granicy prostej zastępowalności pokoleń). Proces starzenia się społeczeństwa jest głównym wyzwaniem demograficznym, we Francji postępuje jednak relatywnie wolniej niż w innych państwach Europy. Z uwagi na swoją sytuację demograficzną Francja realnie wpływa na kształt polityki europejskiej, m.in. w zakresie migracji zagranicznych.
Celem opracowania jest rozpoznanie: wielkości, zmian i zróżnicowania współczynnika dzietności w województwie wielkopolskim według powiatów, kształtu i siły zależności między współczynnikiem dzietności a dochodem na 1 mieszkańca w powiatach województwa wielkopolskiego. Zakres czasowy opracowania obejmuje lata 1999–2010. Źródłem opracowania były dane Banku Danych Regionalnych za lata 1999–2010 zawarte na stronie internetowej Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego. Do opisu dynamiki współczynnika dzietności wykorzystano indeksy dynamiki o podstawie stałej, a do określenia wpływu dochodu na współczynnik dzietności ogólnej – analizę korelacji regresji dwu zmiennych. Rezultaty badania ukazały, że w badanym okresie, w badanym województwie i powiatach współczynniki dzietności nie zapewniały prostej reprodukcji ludności. W badanych powiatach analizowanego województwa w latach 2000–2010 współczynniki dzietności są zróżnicowane co do intensywności i kierunku. W postępowaniu badawczym potwierdzono hipotezę o zależności współczynnika dzietności ogólnej od dochodu na 1 mieszkańca. Oszacowane modele regresji współczynnika dzietności względem dochodu różnią się kształtem według środowiska zamieszkania.
EN
The aim of this paper is to identify the size and diversity of changes to the fertility rate in the Wielkopolska region by county; namely the shape and strength of the relationship between fertility rate and income per capita in the districts of Wielkopolska. The study covers the years 1999–2010. It is based on data from the Regional Data Bank for the years 1999–2010 published on the website of the Polish Central Statistical Office. To describe the dynamics of the fertility rate fixed-base indexes were used; and to determine the impact of incomes on total fertility rate, a regression analysis on the correlation of two variables. The results of the study showed that during the period analysed, fertility rates in the region and its counties did not provide a simple reproductive model for the population. In the counties studied during the 2000–2010 period, the intensity and direction of fertility rates varied. Additionally, the hypothesis of a correlation between total fertility rate and income per capita was confirmed. Finally, the estimated regression models of fertility rates relative to income vary according to the living environment.
This text draws current demographic processes and presents how they can influence education at present and in the future. This is divided into four main parts. The first deals with the analysis of total fertility rate and natural increase. Problems associated with immigration are briefly presented in the second part. Part three and four reflects on some results of demographic trends and dominant models of schooling.
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