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EN
In his metatheoretical deliberations on the subject and the methods used in the sacra doctrina Thomas Aquinas does not refer to the four causes of mental model or even the typology of scientific questions, advanced by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics. As a result, in the first issue of his commentary he gives not four, but five articles. It was dictated by the consistent use within the theology developed by the metaphysics of being as existing and manifesting its existence through five transcendental properties, ie, the reality of unity, individuality, truth and goodness. This behaviour of the theologian, who is explaining the intricacies of shots in the relevant field for himself, and by reference to the correct application of philosophy and other sciences, in the opinion of Thomas is the right way to implement the guideline contained in formulas auctoritates: Crede ut intelligas (Augustine) fidem si potes rationemque coniunge (Boethius), fides quaerens intellectum (Anselm). At the same time it allows him to emphasize the difference between theology and revealed theology, which is part of metaphysics. In his opinion, the metaphysical consideration take into account the concept of being as existing, and in the sacra doctrina we use the concept of being as a creature, because it is a derivative of one of the articles of faith.
EN
The article presents the classical vision of beauty depicted by one of the most outstanding German philosophers alive. Trying to outline it independently, the German scholar is in principle inspired by the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle and Plato. In the article we get to know nearly all the most important aspects of beauty, which are in the scope of classical view. Thus, beauty is considered in the context of good, in the transcendental sense and with reference to joy. The issue of God’s beauty and the beautiful life is also explained. Finally, the attempt to define the concept of beauty is undertaken
EN
In this article, we consider the problem of the equivalence of transcendentals: beauty, truth and good, in the perspective of two great thinkers of the twentieth century: H. U. von Balthasar and J. Tischner. Based on the confrontation of their reflections, we introduce the concept of the paradox of the “strugle of transcendentals” and we analyze the philosophical positions they occupy in this matter. The obtained research results, concerning all transcendentals, are then concretized on the agathological ground, where the similarities and differences in views of both authors are apparent. A common ground for Balthasar and Tischner consists in the recognition of good as a fundamental transcendentale in the development of (theo)dramatic reflection. The basic difference is revealed in their perception of the relation of good to other transcendentals. Tischner is in favor of the absolute primacy of good among all transcendentals, while Balthasar admits only a relative primacy in this case. In the final section of the work we indicate some shortcomings of both approaches and we propose a soteriological-anthropological example illustrating the validity of tischnerian approach.
PL
W niniejszym artykule rozpatrujemy problem równoważności transcendentaliów: piękna, prawdy i dobra, w ujęciu dwóch znakomitych myślicieli XX wieku: H. U. von Balthasara i J. Tischnera. Opierając się na konfrontacji ich refleksji, wprowadzamy pojęcie paradoksu „walki transcendentaliów” i analizujemy stanowiska filozoficzne, jakie zajmują oni wobec tego zagadnienia. Uzyskane wyniki badań, dotyczące ogółu transcendentaliów, konkretyzujemy następnie na gruncie agatologicznym, na którym najwyraźniej zarysowują się podobieństwa i różnice w poglądach obu autorów. Wspólną płaszczyzną dla Balthasara i Tischnera okazuje się być uznanie dobra jako transcendentale fundamentalnego dla rozwijania refleksji (teo)dramatycznej. Podstawowa różnica ujawnia się w ich postrzeganiu relacji dobra do pozostałych transcendentaliów. Tischner opowiada się za absolutnym prymatem dobra wśród transcendentaliów, Balthasar dopuszcza w tym przypadku jedynie prymat relatywny. W końcowej sekcji pracy zwracamy uwagę na pewne mankamenty obu podejść i proponujemy soteriologiczno-antropologiczny przykład ilustrujący zasadność podejścia Tischnerowskiego.
EN
The need to preserve a realistic cognition of the world is imperative for realistic philosophy in the face of idealism, subjectivism and relativism. This paper captures the effort of a philosopher who is “faithful to reality” through his works. The [absolute] transcendental properties of being are real properties of real beings; they are neither empty concepts nor constructions of the mind detached from the existing being. They form the foundation for the rationality of the world without which nothing is knowable. There is also a method proper to the discovery of these properties. This method which is known as metaphysical separation demonstrates that realistic cognition is not naïve cognition; it enables us to discover that whatever exists is a determinate content with proportional existence, undivided in itself and divided from others, as well as a vehicle of truth, good and beauty. It is precisely in this sense that something is being, thing, one, something, truth, good and beauty.
PL
Potrzeba zachowania realistycznego poznania świata jest konieczna dla filozofii realistycznej w obliczu idealizmu, subiektywizmu i relatywizmu. Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje wysiłek filozofa, który jest „wierny rzeczywistości”. Transcendentalne właściwości bytu są prawdziwymi właściwościami rzeczywistych istot; nie są ani pustymi ideami, ani konstruktami umysłu oderwanymi od istoty. Stanowią one podstawę racjonalności świata, bez której nic nie jest możliwe do poznania. Istnieje również metoda odpowiednia do odkrycia tych właściwości. Ta metoda to separacja metafizyczna, która dowodzi, że poznanie realistyczne nie jest naiwnym poznaniem, albowiem separacja pozwala nam odkryć, że cokolwiek co istnieje, jest determinowaną treścią o konkretnym istnieniu, niepodzielną w sobie i różną od innych, jak również jest nośnikiem prawdy, dobra i piękna
EN
The problem of properties of being as being as such, has been undertaken in metaphysics almost from the beginning of its cultivation. The stages of this story are marked by figures such as Aristotle, Avicenna, Philip Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, followed by Duns Scotus, Peter Olivi, Francis Suárez, Thomas Campanella and others. We are interested in the Thomistic theory of transcendentals, however, as far as Thomas Aquinas did not write a separate treatise on transcendentals, neither did he elaborate the entire concept in his writings, this theory is more the work of Thomists than Aquinas himself. Therefore, it seems reasonable to pay attention to his antagonists (like Duns Scotus) and followers (like Suarez) who have influenced the Thomist vision of the transcendentals. The philosophical theory of transcendentals, since they constitute the most important properties of being, depends directly on the concept of existence itself. Otherwise, it will be formulated in essentialist metaphysics (eg in traditional Thomism), differently in different versions of transcendentalizing Thomism, and still different in existential Thomism, where transcendentals are directly related to the existence of being. The basis of the transcendental accounts, at least in existential Thomism, are the statements of Aquinas himself, scattered throughout his various writings, although the starting point is usually the text from the Quaestione disputate de veritate, where Aquinas most broadly formulates the general concept of existential property. Starting from the Aristotelian definition of being, Thomas writes that certain concepts can be applied to being, but they do not add anything new to the concept, but point only to a modus entis. These modi entis are also referred to as modi essendi (“the mode of existence”) or even aliquid in ente (“something in being”). In the following passages Aquinas says that they are “interchangeable” with being. In this way, he wants to emphasize that we are dealing with various aspects of being as being, and not with additional, more detailed beings, qualifications. They can be certain “measures”, “ways” or “determinants” of being, or existence (modi entis or modi essendi) or “consequences”, “consequences” (consequentiae) in relation to themselves (in se) or in relation to to something else (ad aliud). Interesting are the views on the philosophy of cognition from the perspective of the transcendental property of truth (Tomasz Pawlikowski), on ethics from the perspective of transcendental good (Artur Andrzejuk), and on the aesthetics from the perspective of the property of beauty (Piotr Jaroszyński). Research on reality, separateness and unity seems to be more difficult, because in the history of philosophy no specific philosophical disciplines have been associated with them, but their problems are dispersed in various philosophical directions and also have a different (though sometimes fundamental) function in them. Tadeusz Klimski and Jan Kiełbasa’s works can be an example of dealing with such an issue.
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Edith Steins Weg zur Wahrheit

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PL
Poszukując drogi do Prawdy, którą okazał się ostatecznie sam Bóg, Edyta Stein połączyła ze sobą dwa kierunki myślenia: fenomenologię oraz tomizm. Pierwszy z nich był dla niej metodą oglądu rzeczywistości, dzięki której przy spełnieniu określonych metodologicznych kroków możliwe było ujęcie istoty rzeczy. Drugi z kolei był źródłem wielorakich idei, zarówno z zakresu epistemologii, ontologii, jak również filozofii człowieka czy teologii, które to E. Stein częściowo przejęła oraz na swój własny, oryginalny sposób rozwinęła. Porównując analizy prawdy autorstwa św. Tomasza, za- mieszczone w dwóch pierwszych kwestiach De veritate z rozważaniami Stein na ten sam temat zawartymi w Bycie skończonym a bycie wiecznym, autorka szkicuje sposób, w jaki filozof oraz święta uzgodniła ze sobą oba kierunki, omawiając jednocześnie przyczyny oraz skutki takiego zabiegu.
EN
On her intellectual journey to the truth, which she after all defined as God himself, Edith Stein had managed to combine two philosophical approaches such as phenomenology and thomism. Former approach was considered by her as a method of describing the reality, which after fulfilling certain steps of methodology, could allow one to reveal the essence of things. The latter one, was perceived by her as a wide and versatile source of ideas obtained not only from epistemology and ontology, but also human philosophy and theology. These ideas were adopted by Stein and developed by her own sophisticated implications. By comparing Thomas Aquinas’ analysis on understanding the truths, contained in the first two parts of Disputed Questions on Truth (Questiones Dispu- tatae de veritate), with her reflections on the same aspect included in Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt to an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross discloses her explanation of synthesising these two philosophical schools, with her reasons and consequences of doing so.
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