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Jokes, aporia and undecidability

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Derrida saw laughter as a version of aporia; and he linked aporia to an undecidability that he ties to fiction. I argue that such undecidability contributes to some jokes. Sometimes this undecidability enables the joke to combine plausibility and delightfulness. More interesting and more aporetic is the way that undecidability contributes to jokes that foreground their textual status (some meta-jokes for instance) and those that have an effect of unfathomability. The jokes considered include one on which Derrida commented and another which was told at his Columbia University memorial service.
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Quite a few results concerning the decidability of mereological theories have been given in my previous paper. But many mereological theories are still left unaccounted for. In this paper I will refine a general method for proving the undecidability of a theory and then by making use of it, I will show that most mereological theories that are strictly weaker than CEM are finitely inseparable and hence undecidable. The same results might be carried over to some extensions of those weak theories by adding the fusion axiom schema. Most of the proofs to be presented in this paper take finite lattices as the base models when applying the refined method. However, I shall also point out the limitation of this kind of reduction and make some observations and conjectures concerning the decidability of stronger mereological theories.
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The incompleteness theorems constitute the mathematical core of Gödel’s philosophical challenge. They are given in their “most satisfactory form”, as Gödel saw it, when the formality of theories to which they apply is characterized via Turing machines. These machines codify human mechanical procedures that can be carried out without appealing to higher cognitive capacities. The question naturally arises, whether the theorems justify the claim that the human mind has mathematical abilities that are not shared by any machine. Turing admits that non-mechanical steps of intuition are needed to transcend particular formal theories. Thus, there is a substantive point in comparing Turing’s views with Gödel’s that is expressed by the assertion, “The human mind infinitely surpasses any finite machine”. The parallelisms and tensions between their views are taken as an inspiration for beginning to explore, computationally, the capacities of the human mathematical mind.
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Stawka większa niż las

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More than forest at stake [Book review – “O jeden las za daleko. Demokracja, kapitalizm i nieposłuszeństwo ekologiczne w Polsce” (A forest too far: democracy, capitalism and ecological disobedience in Poland), red. Przemysław Czapliński, Joanna B. Bednarek, Dawid Gostyński, Książka i Prasa, Warszawa 2019, ss. 365]
PL
Stawka większa niż las [Recenzja książki: „O jeden las za daleko. Demokracja, kapitalizm i nieposłuszeństwo ekologiczne w Polsce”, red. Przemysław Czapliński, Joanna B. Bednarek, Dawid Gostyński, Książka i Prasa, Warszawa 2019, ss. 365]
EN
This paper will first introduce first-order mereotopological ax- ioms and axiomatized theories which can be found in some recent litera- ture and it will also give a survey of decidability, undecidability as well as other relevant notions. Then the main result to be given in this paper will be the finite inseparability of any mereotopological theory up to atomic general mereotopology (AGEMT) or strong atomic general mereotopology (SAGEMT). Besides, a more comprehensive summary will also be given via making observations about other properties stronger than undecidability.
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