Search results - CEJSH

1

Religious and Spiritual Values Central to Personality and Behaviour

100%

Morin M.-L.

Open Theology

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2016

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vol. 2

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issue 1

EN

Following a review and analysis of Allen E. Bergin’s article “Psychotherapy and Religious Values,” this paper anticipates future directions for integrating clients’ religious and spiritual values in psychology and psychotherapy research and practice. The author argues that to support Bergin’s suggestion that such values are no longer “at the fringe of clinical psychology [but rather] at the center” of our comprehension of personality and its aspirations, researchers and clinicians in psychology need to go beyond the “methodolatry” denounced by Bergin and associated with probabilistic practices. For that purpose, she first presents the considerations of Experiential Ontological Phenomenology (EOP), to which the concept of will is added, as a methodological scientific foundation to a value-based model in psychotherapy. She then introduces the principal concept of this model, the fundamental value, presented in relationship with the second most important concept, the psychological nub, derived from psychoanalytic concepts. The third basic concept, the subjective process, borrowed from the humanistic approach, is mentioned as being included in the EOP theory. Finally, a brief case study demonstrates how this model constitutes a point of integration at which theistic values or belief systems and psychological studies and practice meet.

2

Zapis windykacyjny jako rozrządzenie o skutku zobowiązująco-rozporządzającym

100%

Górniak K.

Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego

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2021

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vol. 30

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issue 2

271-308

EN

Legatum per vindicationem was introduced into Polish law in 2011. The majority of legal scholars treat it as the type of a testamentary disposition that solely results in the acquisition of ownership by a legatee. It has, therefore, only ‘real’ effect and is not a source of any obligation between an heir and a legatee. The aim of this article is to prove the opposite. The main thesis is that legatum per vindicationem also results in the obligation to transfer ownership and take over a thing that is due to a legatee by an heir. It is, thus, a testamentary disposition, which can be regarded as legatum per damnationem (the so-called ‘ordinary’ legacy) combined with an additional ‘real’ effect, namely, the automatic acquisition of ownership of a thing bequeathed by a legatee. This theoretical assumption can be supported by at least three arguments. Firstly, by the wording of Article 9816 of the Polish Civil Code (the PCC) which provides that the provisions on legatum per damnationem apply accordingly to legatum per vindicationem (to all the aspects not dealt with differently). Secondly, by the findings of the jurisprudence as regards unjustified enrichment. The additional ‘obligational’ effect of legatum per vindicationem seems to properly ‘justify” the fact that it is through the legacy that a legatee becomes enriched. The material benefit gained by a legatee is, in this way, ‘justified’ in the light of the unjustified enrichment regime. Thirdly, the view presented in this article corresponds with the way in which ownership is transferred in Polish law inter vivos. Polish law has adopted a consensual model of the transfer of ownership (that is based on French law) which presumes the ‘double’ effect of a contract. Similarly, legatum per vindicationem can be regarded as a disposition with ‘double’ effect. The article reveals practical consequences of the presented thesis. Perhaps the most important of them is the following one: due to the fact that it has the ‘obligational’ effect, legatum per vindicationem should be governed by the provisions on the performance of obligations and the effects of non-performance (Articles 450–486 of the PCC), as well as by the provisions on legatum per damnationem providing for the time limit of the performance (Article 970 of the PCC) and the responsibility for defects in the thing bequeathed (Article 978 of the PCC).

3

La volonté et le choix. Le motif de la « femme de Putiphar » dans les lais français des XII et XIIIe siècles

100%

Gęsicka A.

Annales Neophilologiarum

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2012

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issue 6

71-86

EN

The article is an attempt at looking at the literary motif of “Potiphar’s wife” in view of the relation of the will of the characters to their love choices. The analysis includes three French lais of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: Lanval by Marie de France and two anonymous works: Lai de Graelent and Lai de Guingamor. Aspect of the will and choice, seemingly insignificant in light of the common, well-defined narrative pattern determining the plot of works, turns out to be an interesting area of freedom for the authors themselves. The way of showing of the decision-making mechanisms allows them to individualize the psychological profiles of characters and to differentiate the level of dramatization of the scenes of choice.

PL

Artykuł jest próbą spojrzenia na literacki motyw „żony Putyfara” pod kątem relacji woli bohaterów do ich miłosnych wyborów. Analiza obejmuje trzy francuskie lais z XII i XIII wieku: Lanval Marie de France oraz anonimowe Lai de Graelent i Lai de Guingamor. Aspekt woli i wyboru, pozornie mało znaczący w świetle wspólnego, wyraźnie określonego schematu narracyjnego określającego przebieg akcji utworów, okazuje się interesującą przestrzenią wolności dla samych autorów. Sposób ukazania mechanizmów podejmowania decyzji pozwala im na zindywidualizowanie psychologicznych sylwetek bohaterów oraz zróżnicowanie poziomu dramatyzacji scen wyboru.

4

El voluntarismo en Escoto: voluntad y libertad

100%

Gordillo Álvarez-Valdés L.

Studia Ełckie

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2012

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vol. 14

95-115

EN

The article reveals reasons of the voluntarism of Duns Scotus. In his conception of freedom, understood as the freedom of will, Duns Scotus endows will with priority. Will becomes a real rational power, followed by intellect that is a natural power. Then ethical and anthropological consequences emerge to show a new way of understanding man. The reasons of the voluntarism of Scotus are analyzed in their historical context. To return his omnipotence to God, Scotus has to prioritize an infinite and limitless willingness in God, understood as charity. Through his will also man relates with God and reaches his ends in praxis. This means a break with tradition since man is to discover le raison d’être of the things not by his ratio, but by his praxis which directs him and allows him to achieve his goals.

5

Autonomie a druhý

88%

Sikora O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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vol. 62

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issue 4

523-538

EN

The article examines the meaning of the other for Kant's idea of autonomy. Autonomy is interpreted, in relation to the universal demand of the ethical, as governing the will by principles. Autonomy as principled self-determination by means of the practical law cannot be understood as the standpoint of an isolated subject. Instead we must understand it as a standpoint taken towards others, which we treat as the aspect of spontaneity, and at the same time as a standpoint taken thanks to others, since others make possible its awakening and development - here the aspect of receptivity is discussed. In this two-way relation between autonomy (enabled by a self-determining goverment by principle) and the other, the character of dialogical mutuality is exhibited: autonomy is the principled considerateness of a good will towards others, and, in order for it to be such, it must be initiated by others.

6

Wydziedziczenie w prawie polskim i prawie stanu Luizjana

88%

Sobota A.

Prawo

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2015

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issue 317

123 - 131

EN

The paper presents the institution of disinheritance in Polish civil law by comparing it with a corresponding institution set forth in the law of Louisiana (the USA). The comparative method applied allows the disinheritance examination from a completely different point of view. It is worth mentioning that the mixed legal system is in force in Louisiana, comprising the elements of the continental and common law. The mixed legal systems are nowadays perceived as examples for any codifications in the world. The paper leads to the conclusion that Polish regulation of the disinheritance in the light of rules of proper legislation leaves much to be desired. Polish provisions on disinheritance are misplaced in the Civil Code without separate chapter, their content is insufficient and their application in practice raises many doubts. In this respect, the corresponding provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code outmatch the Polish provisions both in quality and quantity, providing more comprehensive and precise regulation. Comparing these two legal systems, it is desirable to provide a separate chapter in the Civil Code for the institution of disinheritance as well as introduce more detailed and precise provisions— in particular on the reasons for disinheritance.

7

Maxa Schelera pojęcie wolności osobowej

88%

Prusik W.

Kultura i Wartości

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2012

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issue 1

19-31

EN

This article constitutes a critical analysis of M. Scheler's understanding of freedom. Scheler demonstrates freedom as a "potency” or "power” (Können) of the will, which is the basis for the freedom of choice and action. Thus, freedom is a personal habitus (Gesamthabitus innerer Freisein); its essence is given in an internal (intentional) feeling, but not in a theoretical consideration. This signifies that the consciousness of freedom is a consciousness of independence of a higher (superior) sphere (centrum) of person from the lower one (spirit from psyche, psyche from vital sphere, vital sphere from the sensual). If freedom is realized in an order of acts of the will, then it is realized in acts of the will and it becomes a "motivated” will. An internal feeling of value (as the motive) is represented as subjective necessity of the will and it therefore makes the will not passive, but rational and free. The reasonable will is a will determined by the motive, given in an internal experience. Thus the freedom of the will is the will "motivated”, i. e., caused by the consciousness of necessity. In this context, freedom is a direct consciousness of indispensable reason; it gains a Neo-Platonian connotation.

PL

Artykuł stanowi krytyczną analizę M. Schelera rozumienia wolności. Scheler pokazuje wolność jako „możność” bądź „moc” (Können) woli, która jest podstawą wolności wyboru i działania. W ten sposób wolność stanowi osobowy habitus, zaś jej istota dana jest w wewnętrznym (intencjonalnym) przeżyciu, a nie w rozważaniu teoretycznym. Znaczy to, że świadomość wolności jest świadomością niezależności wyższej sfery („centrum”) osoby od sfery niższej (ducha od psychiki, psychiki od sfery witalnej, sfery witalnej od zmysłowej). Jeżeli wolność realizuje się w porządku aktów woli, to chcenie staje się „chceniem umotywowanym”. Wewnętrzne przeżycie wartości (jako motywu) przedstawia się jako subiektywna konieczność chcenia, sprawiająca, że chcenie nie jest już dowolne, lecz racjonalne (sensowne) i wolne. Sensowne chcenie to chcenie zdeterminowane przez motyw dany w wewnętrznym doświadczeniu. Wolna wola jest więc chceniem umotywowanym, podyktowanym świadomością konieczności. W tym kontekście wolność jest bezpośrednim uświadomieniem konieczności i uzyskuje konotację neoplatońską.

8

The relationship between will and reason in the moral philosophies of Kant and Aquinas

88%

Rowan A. M.

Logos i Ethos

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2015

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issue 1(38)

93–130

EN

Both Kant and Aquinas ground moral action in reason and will; however, this seems to be the end of the similarity in their approaches with respect to the role of reason and will in moral action. The goal of this essay is to show that Aquinas’ notion of the will as the rational appetite is superior to Kant’s notion of good will in providing the foundation for moral action. To this effect, I analyze the relationship between will and reason in their moral philosophies. I discuss Kant’s notion of will in both its moral and phenomenal modes, and Aquinas’ notion of will as the rational appetite and of human act. I argue that Aquinas’s notion of will and moral act is superior to that of Kant for several reasons. First and foremost, the notion of morally worthy action accommodates human nature with its inclinations, tendencies, and desires. It is not divorced from human physical and emotional nature. Second, in contrast to Kant’s will, Aquinas’s will retains its own identity. That is, it avails itself of reason’s search for truth and meaning, yet it does not collapse into reason, specifically logic. Third, Aquinas’ will is dynamic. In contrast to Kant’s, which in order to be moral simply follows the laws of logic, Aquinas’ will desires the good and propels a person to action. Finally, Aquinas’ notion of human act, in the sense that it involves both the counsel of reason and will’s capacity to desire the good, offers a more holistic understanding of human moral act and its possible consequences. In contrast to Kant’s will’s rigid command to obey the law, Aquinas’ notion of will and human act also gives reasons why we need to be moral. We must act morally, not only because our action would otherwise be self-contradictory or not live up to the letter of the law, but because our choices and our actions have real consequences in the world.

9

PREPARATION OF WILLS IN TIMES OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC – SELECTED OBSERVATIONS

88%

Załucki M.

Journal of Modern Science

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2020

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issue 2/45/2020

143-152

EN

Objectives: The aim of the article is to present selected aspects of the issue of making wills in a pandemic, including the search for answers to the question of how to make a valid will. Selected legal systems, which have presented solutions for drawing up wills in the COVID-19 pandemic will be analyzed. Since some legislators have prepared and enacted appropriate facilities for the use of formal instruments for disposing of property upon death specifically for the pandemic period, the author looks at these solutions and wonders whether it is appropriate to deformalize the law of succession for the period after the pandemic. Because of that, a path for the legislator's future is be proposed, in the light of current trends in the world of testamentary formalities. Material and methods: The analysis of legal solutions will be based on the dogmatic method, which will be supported by comparative considerations. Results: Presentation of selected aspects of the issue of making wills in a pandemic, including the proposed answers to the question of how to make a valid will. Conclusions: It is appropriate to deformalize the law of succession for the period after the pandemic. The solutions adopted during the pandemic have shown that it is possible for testators to take greater account of their interests. In succession law such solutions were and still are expected.

10

Versuch einer textlinguistischen Analyse ausgewählter deutschsprachiger Testamente des Königlich Preußischen Adels aus dem 17. Jahrhundert

88%

Paluch A., Owsiński P. A.

Acta Neophilologica

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2021

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vol. XXIII/2

49-68

EN

This article presents an attempt to show the specific features of the German legal language in the chosen wills of the nobility from Royal Prussia of the 17th century, in the area of German settlement in the East. The investigation aims to answer the question as to whether the examined testaments suit the pattern of the will as a text type. The author focuses on the graphemic, lexical and syntactic levels of the testament. The outline of structure and function of wills provides the background for such a defined research area.

11

Koncepcja woli a rozumienie wiary. Ujęcie realistyczne, aprioryczne i pozytywistyczne

88%

Sieńkowski M.

Studia Ełckie

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2019

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vol. 21

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issue 3

363-384

EN

The purpose of the article is to show the relationships between the concept of will and understanding of faith. It is about demonstrating that the adopted concept of the will affects the understanding of faith. Selected concepts of will (realistic, a priori, positivist) were presented in terms of their pursuit of God. When it turns out that God is the object of the will, faith acquires a natural foundation. This means that the will that naturally reaches God comes into a relationship with Him even before faith develops. Consequently, it must be recognized that there is a natural and moral foundation for faith. This kindof foundation exists on the basis of a realistic concept of will. In a priori morality, due to the concept of the will, only moral faith is possible. Positivist philosophy replaces the will with social feelings. That is why faith is understood as trust and is only natural.

12

Ustanowienie fundacji w testamencie – czynność prawna mortis causa czy inter vivos?

88%

Trzewik J.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2021

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issue 4(165)

189-203

EN

An unambiguous settlement of the legal nature of the act of establishing a foundation in a will is in fact a problematic issue. It seems obvious that it constitutes a legal act in the event of death. It seems that the view presented in the doctrine regarding the possibility of establishing a foundation in a will requires a certain correction. In casu it may transpire that such an act may be classified as a legal act between the living. This results from the possibility of making a distinction between the act of establishing a foundation in a will and the fact of establishing it as the beneficiary of the inheritance. This undoubtedly affects the legal situation of the established foundation, as well as the sphere of inheritance from the bequeather-testator. In any case, however, only the assessment of a specific actual state, and in particular the actual content of dispositions made by the testator, may allow for a proper classification of individual actions.

13

Charakterystyka semantyczna wyrażeń chcąc nie chcąc i mimo woli

88%

Żochowska N.

Linguistica Copernicana

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2013

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issue 1(9)

143-163

EN

The article discusses lexical units chcąc nie chcąc and mimo woli, which are used in contemporary Polish. Firstly, the author justifies why she considers chcąc nie chcąc and mimo woli as lexical units. Later, she describes features of the expressions under discussion by showing restrictions in their lexical collocations. Among other things, the author investigates whether there is a component communicating necessity in the expression chcąc nie chcąc and whether the unit mimo woli refers to a moment preceding the initation of an action. The analysis conducted in the article shows that when we describe an activity with the expression mimo woli, we declare that somebody did not decide on initating it. Whereas the expression chcąc nie chcąc, states that something caused a given action and that it was not the will of the person who initiated it to do so. At the end of the article, the author presents the semantic explications of the expressions studied.

14

THE ACTS OF THE WILL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

88%

Wiśniewski H.

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2015

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vol. 4

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issue 2

149-163

EN

The article attempts to clarify an important aspect of St. Thomas Aquinas’s theory of human action, namely to show these acts of man which are immediately caused by the will. According to some contemporary philosophers, the acts of the will are limited to those of trying or of intending. Do they exhaust the whole possibility of the will to act? The author seeks to answer this question basing his considerations on the analysis of the Summa Theologiae by St. Thomas Aquinas.