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PAVEL TICHÝ A TEORIE DEDUKCE

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Šebela K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 2
66 – 74
EN
This paper focuses on the theory of deduction, developed by the Czech logician Pavel Tichý. Research on deduction in Tichý’s logic is still not very advanced. Tichý’s own deduction system is a generalization of Gentzen’s natural deduction and although it is an interesting topic in itself, I’d rather focus on the theory or philosophy of deduction that motivates Tichý’s choice of deduction system. Some of Tichý’s expressions suggest that in the question of the status of the theory of deduction in logic he held the prevailing modern approach, but this contradicts the fact that most of his writings concern selected problems of logical semantics. Having introduced Tichý’s original conception of deduction, I pay attention to the so called object-conception of logic, which explains the special position of the theory of deduction in his conception.
2

COMMON SOURCE OF THE PARADOXES OF INFERENCE AND ANALYSIS

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Šebela K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 2
222 – 242
EN
The paper deals with the paradoxes of inference and analysis. It attempts to show what is specific about these paradoxes. They have got a lot in common. Often, they are not considered paradoxes in the strict sense at all. Moreover, they both raise the same problem: How can the requirements of correctness and informativeness are both met for inference and for conceptual analysis? The strategies developed to address the problem are similar for both cases. In the paper, the author claims that the paradoxes have common origins. This claim is supported by comparing different strategies adopted to resolve the problem. Regarding their origins, both paradoxes share the epistemological framework that is grounded in Aristotle’s theory of science. This is related to the problem of implicit knowledge, which is a variation on a dilemma formulated by Plato in his Meno. Aristotle’s solution to the dilemma of Meno is discussed and considered as another plausible strategy for dealing with the paradoxes of inference and analysis.
3

KANT A FUNKCIONÁLNÍ TEORIE PREDIKACE

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Šebela K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 1
166 – 177
EN
This paper focuses on the roots of a functional theory of predication, which is represented primary by Frege and Russell. After a brief presentation of the theory of Frege, the author concentrates on the philosophical motivation of this theory. The example of the influence of F. H. Bradley on Russell’s conception of the categorical judgements shows a common epistemological position of both authors, which he recognizes also in Frege. The point of the article is to find common grounds in Kant noetics, especially in his conception of synthetic judgement. Replacement of the problematic Kant’s notion of transcendental schema by the functional application subsequently allowed flourishing of the theory. In conclusion, the author outlines potential problems associated with the challenge of philosophical assumptions on which this theory is based.
4
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Platonismus Pavla Tichého

100%
Šebela K.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 6
931-943
EN
This article addresses the Platonism of the Czech philosopher and logician Pavel Tichý. This is not an easy task as Tichý’s texts are first and foremost detailed analyses of concrete logical problems. The article therefore draws in part on the texts of Tichý’s followers, especially those of P. Materna, M. Duží and J. Raclavský. The author compares Tichý’s version of Platonism with the ancient version of Platonism and then with Aristotle’s critique of Platonism. Reference is made to Aristotle’s (probable) work Peri Ideōn, in which arguments defending Platonism are invariably presented prior to Aris­totle’s critique of them. At the beginning of every chapter there is thus always to be found an argument from Peri Ideōn defending Platonism and then the Aristotelian critique of that argument. The arguments in question are the Argument of Scientific Knowledge, the Argument of the One in Multiplicity, and the Argument of the Object of Thinking. Analogies between ancient arguments and Tichý’s defence of Platonism allow the author to apply Aristotle’s critique to Tichý’s view. The kernel of Aristotle’s critique which, in the author’s opinion, is also relevant to Tichý’s conception, consists in the fact that the arguments presented, though they correctly point to there being something common to a plurality of things, do not justify one to postulate a concrete conception (in this case a Platonic one) of universals.
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