THE DYNAMIC COURNOT DUOPOLY GAME

• Authors: Drabik E.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

This paper attempts to describe an evolutionary game theoretic model of Cournot competition. Every discrete time period a large population of firms is matched in pairs randomly to play a Cournot duopoly game. The authoress assumes the firms to act according to behavioral rules. A behavioral rule specifies the quantity to be produced in current period as a function of past observation. That behavioral rules are costly to operate. The cost depend on the informational and computational requirements of implementing the rule. Each firm chooses a behavioral rule from a finite set of different rules, which are commonly known. A firm takes into account the past realized profits of the costs associated with the behavioral rules. The model of dynamic Cournot duopoly game is described by non-linear evolutionary dynamical system. The authoress focuses on two specifications of Cournot duopoly game: linear and linear-quadratic and shows that bifurcation routes complicating dynamics occur in a linear-quadratic model due to which fact strange atractors arise.

Keywords

EN

BIFURCATION THEORY; COURENT COMPETITION; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

Discipline

• ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS

• Publisher: Główny Urząd Statystyczny
• Journal: Przegląd Statystyczny
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 7-23
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Drabik E.

• E. Drabik, Szkola Glówna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie, Katedra Ekonometrii i Informatyki, ul. Nowoursynowska 166, 02-787 Warszawa, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

06PLAAAA01573442