CENTRAL ADMISSION SYSTEMS. STRATAGEMS AND STABILITY (Kozponti felveteli rendszerek. Taktikazas es stabilitas)

• Authors: Koczy-A. Laszlo
• Languages of publication: HU

Abstracts

EN

The mechanisms used in centralized student assignment programme to match applicants with places in schools and on courses of study vary, but they all rest on a number of basic principles. Natural requirements for matching are stability, Pareto optimization or strategy proofing. The paper presents both good and less good matching mechanisms, discusses their properties, and relates them to their degree of success when applied in real life. The mechanisms in use in Hungary will be the subject of another paper.

Keywords

EN

ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; ANALYSIS OF POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION; BARGAINING THEORY; COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EDUCATION AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS; MATCHING THEORY

Discipline

• ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS

• Publisher: Committee for Economic Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 56
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 422-442
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Koczy-A. Laszlo

• Laszlo Koczy-A., no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

10HUAAAA07882