WILLIAMA ROWE'S BAYESIAN ARGUMENT FROM EVIL AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSEMENT (Williama Rowe'a bayesianski argument ze zla przeciwko istnieniu Boga)

• Authors: Hubaczek Krzysztof
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this article is to present the Bayesian formulation of the argument from evil for atheism in the context of the contemporary debate on Rowe's initial inductive formulation of the argument. At first the author presents the key premises and the basic elements of the Bayesian formulation (esp. Bayes' theorem, the notion of epistemic probability, etc.). Then he discusses the most important challenges to Rowe's claims, both weak and strong. The main problem with the Bayesian formulation of the argument is that it does not accomplish what it was intended for: it fails to avoid the confrontation with skeptical theism. The latter has to be refuted in order to save Rowe's argument (no matter which formulation we take into account, the inductive or the Bayesian). It seems that the debate about Rowe's evidential argument from evil has reached a deadlock - more and more analytic philosophers of religion claim we should return to the logical formulation of the problem of evil.

Keywords

EN

BAYES`THEOREM; EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY; PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENT FROM EVIL; ROWE WILLIAM; SCEPTICAL THEISM

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 36
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 65-84
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Hubaczek Krzysztof

• Krzysztof Hubaczek, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, Instytut Filozofii, ul.Krakowska 61/69, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09PLAAAA055713