Sú fyzické indivíduá kontingentné entity?

• Authors: Pavel Cmorej

Title variants

EN

Are Physical Individuals Contingent Entities?

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

In his article “An Approach to Intensional Analysis” (published in Noûs 1971), Pavel Tichý defended the view that individuals in the universe of discourse should be testable physical objects and all possible worlds should have the same universe of discourse. This entails that physical individuals are necessary entities and in the case of temporal worlds it entails the conclusion that they are eternal entities. In this article the reasons leading P. Tichý to this view are analysed, and the conclusion is reached that his argumentation holds only in a narrower sense of existence test.

Keywords

EN

the understanding of individuals in the transparent intensional logic of P. Tichý; existential text of the individual; the constancy of the universe of the individual; the identification of individuals in time; the essence of the individual and its identificability

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 883-899
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Pavel  Cmorej

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic