EXPRESSIBILITY AND TRUTHMAKER MAXIMALISM: A PROBLEM

• Authors: Wisnewski J. J.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Advocates of 'truthmaker' theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a 'truthmaker') and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a proposition). The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve 'truthmaker' theory.

Keywords

EN

ARMSTRONG D. M.; EXPRESSIBILITY; MAXIMALISM; TRUTHMAKERS

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 49-52
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Wisnewski J. J.

• J. Jeremy Wisnewski, Department of Philosophy, Hartwick College, Oneonta, NY 13820, USA

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA02244703