Obecnost morálního soudu u Davida Huma

• Authors: Stanislav Synek

Title variants

EN

The Generality of Moral Judgement in David Hume

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The article enquires into how David Hume understands the emergence of moral feeling by the adoption of a general point of view and by consideration of the general interest of humanity. In the first part, we briefly present the main characteristics and the specifics of Hume’s moral philosophy. In the second part, we focus on questions concerning the adoption of a general point of view at the level of a narrow circle and society, and also on the contradictions which the theme in question brings with it. With the help of the essay “Of the Standard of Taste” we then offer, in conclusion, an answer in which we present Hume’s moral perspective as a “theoretical” project in a broad sense of the word.

Keywords

EN

David Hume; moral philosophy; general point of view; reason; moral feeling; justice; , taste

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 65
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 253-274
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Stanislav Synek

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic