STRAWSON AND KANT ON BEING 'I'

• Authors: Kunes Jan
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant's metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejected the foundations of Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a sort of psychology. His argument against Kant's conception of subject, or of the 'I', can be found in his conception of a person. However, a closer investigation of this Strawson's conception can reveal that it is not enough comprehensive compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understood the part of being 'I' which can be known via self-knowledge but he failed to appreciate the second part of being 'I', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson's conception with Kant's conception of being 'I' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson's purpose, Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.

Keywords

EN

KANT IMMANUEL; METAPHYSICS; PERSON; SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-KNOWLEDGE; STRAWSON P. F.

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 493-509
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kunes Jan

• Jan Kunes, Filosoficky ustav AV CR, Jilska 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/organon

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

10SKAAAA074811