Emotions as a moral Sanction in Mill's and Hume's Philosophy

• Authors: Gornicka J.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The utilitarianism of J.S. Mill is similar in some respects to the moral philosophy of David Hume. In both theories the idea of emotional sources of moral experience is derived from empirical epistemology; in both theories emotions operate as sanctions of moral choices and moral acts. However as Mill's normative preferences are quite clear, Hume's position is a descriptive one: he only analyses human nature and psychological aspects of moral choice without adopting any axiological standpoint. It seems also interesting to compare the idea of justice, as a so-called social virtue, in Hume's theory with the same idea in Mill. The two philosophers recognize its deep psychological roots and its important role in everyday moral life.

Keywords

EN

EMOTIONS AS MORAL SANCTIONS (MILL J. S. & HUME D.)

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 4(60)
• Pages: 193-205
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Gornicka J.

• J. Gornicka, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07PLAAAA02425039