EN
This article addresses the Platonism of the Czech philosopher and logician Pavel Tichý. This is not an easy task as Tichý’s texts are first and foremost detailed analyses of concrete logical problems. The article therefore draws in part on the texts of Tichý’s followers, especially those of P. Materna, M. Duží and J. Raclavský. The author compares Tichý’s version of Platonism with the ancient version of Platonism and then with Aristotle’s critique of Platonism. Reference is made to Aristotle’s (probable) work Peri Ideōn, in which arguments defending Platonism are invariably presented prior to Aristotle’s critique of them. At the beginning of every chapter there is thus always to be found an argument from Peri Ideōn defending Platonism and then the Aristotelian critique of that argument. The arguments in question are the Argument of Scientific Knowledge, the Argument of the One in Multiplicity, and the Argument of the Object of Thinking. Analogies between ancient arguments and Tichý’s defence of Platonism allow the author to apply Aristotle’s critique to Tichý’s view. The kernel of Aristotle’s critique which, in the author’s opinion, is also relevant to Tichý’s conception, consists in the fact that the arguments presented, though they correctly point to there being something common to a plurality of things, do not justify one to postulate a concrete conception (in this case a Platonic one) of universals.