FALSIFICATIONISM AND THE PRAGMATIC PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

• Authors: Frederick Danny
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

Keywords

EN

FALSIFICATION; INDUCTION; POPPER KARL; PRAGMATIC PROBLEM

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 494 – 503

Contributors

author

Frederick Danny

• 13 Sandhurst Road, Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 2LG, United Kingdom

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27405