PREČO LEN (NUTNÉ) PRAVDY AKO PREDPOKLADY DEDUKTÍVNYCH ÚSUDKOV?

• Authors: František Gahér , Lukáš Bielik

Title variants

EN

Why (just) necessary truth as assumptions in deductive inferences?

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

The aim of the paper is to examine Tichý’s understanding of the term “assumption”. We show that Tichý distinguishes two approaches to inference: the one-dimensional view that treats inferences as a sequences of logical rules or axioms as well as hypotheses and their logical consequences; and the two-dimensional view specifying inference as a derivation of one entailment from (the set of) another entailment(s). It is claimed that Tichý is right in his critique of Meinong’s concept of assumption as ‘assertion without conviction’. Nevertheless, Tichý – in addition to his logical concept of assumption – uses, though unreflectively, also the epistemic concept of assumption. Henceforth, we claim that accepting Tichý’s rejection of the epistemic hypothetical assumptions we couldn’t use logic as an instrument for empirical knowledge enhancement. We believe, to the contrary, that the epistemic assumptions may become a basis for derivations and knowledge enhancement, even though they do not represent necessary truths.

Keywords

EN

ASSUMPTIONS; EMPIRICAL TRUTH; INFERENCE; NECESSARY TRUTH; TICHÝ

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: suppl. 2
• Pages: 75 – 97

Contributors

author

František Gahér

• Katedra logiky a metodológie vied, Filozofická fakulta, Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, Šafárikovo nám. 6, 814 99 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

author

Lukáš Bielik