EPISTEMICKÝ KONTEXTUALIZMUS A JEHO MOTIVÁCIA

• Authors: Marian Zouhar

Title variants

EN

Epistemic contextualism and its motivation

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

According to Keith DeRose, the best argument for epistemic contextualism is supplied by communication intuitions ordinary speakers have when evaluating utterances of sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p”. It is claimed that utterances of “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p” can both be true with respect to the same S and p because the speakers of the utterances employ different epistemic standards. The aim of the paper is to show that one can accept this claim as true while denying epistemic contextualism. A handful of possible contenders to epistemic contextualism are given. Thus, the alleged best argument for contextualism has to be supplemented by other arguments to show that epistemic contextualism should be given preference to the other approaches.

Keywords

EN

CONTEXT; EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM; DEROSE; TRUTH CONDITIONS; PROPOSITION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: suppl. 2
• Pages: 171 – 186

Contributors

author

Marian Zouhar

• Katedra logiky a metodológie vied, Filozofická fakulta, Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, Šafárikovo nám. 6, 814 99 Bratislava, Slovak Republic