FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL

• Authors: Alex Blum
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.

Keywords

EN

FOREKNOWLEDGE; FREE WILL

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 55 – 57

Contributors

author

Alex Blum

• Department of Philosophy, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel