EXPLANAČNÍ MONISMUS U NEKAUZÁLNÍCH VYSVĚTLENÍ

• Authors: Zámečník Lukáš

Title variants

EN

Explanatory monism in non-causal explanations

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations.

Keywords

EN

NON-CAUSAL; EXPLANATION; EXPLANATORY MONISM; PLURALISM; UNIFICATIONIST VIEWS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 77
• Issue: 8
• Pages: 590 – 607

Contributors

author

Zámečník Lukáš

• Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, Filozofická fakulta, Křížkovského 10, 771 80 Olomouc, Czech Republic

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0965-4583

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.8.2