EMPIRICKÁ VÝZVA FILOSOFICKÉMU POJETÍ MYSLI

• Authors: Martin Vraný

Title variants

EN

Empirical challenge to the philosophical conception of mind

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifically, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind.

Keywords

EN

COGNITIVE SCIENCE; CONSCIOUSNESS; LANGUAGE; PHILOSOPHY OF MIND; MODULARITY; MIND

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 50 – 71

Contributors

author

Martin Vraný

• Ústav filosofie a religionistiky, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, Nám. J. Palacha 2, 116 38 Praha, Czech Republic