MILLOVO POJETÍ ČÍSLA

• Authors: Prokop Sousedík , David Svoboda

Title variants

EN

Mill’s conception of number

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

According to the positivists, all our knowledge is based on experience which is the foundation not only of every empirical science, but also of those disciplines that are usually considered to be a priori. The paper consists of two main parts. Firstly, a positivist concept of number defended by J. S. Mill is presented; secondly, it is shown how this conception can settle some objections coming from apriori-oriented philosophers. Mill’s theory of number is interesting for at least two historical reasons. It is developed in connection with a relatively rich scholastic logic which is why its methodology is similar to the contemporary philosophy of language; it is indispensable for an appropriate comprehension of the concept of number that was proposed by Mill’s most famous opponent G. Frege.

Keywords

EN

ARITHMETIC; FREGE; INDUCTION; MILL; NUMBER

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 201 – 221

Contributors

author

Prokop Sousedík

• Katolická teologická fakulta, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Thákurova 3, 160 00 Praha 6, Czech Republic

author

David Svoboda