ONTOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF BEING A PERCEPTUAL ATTITUDE

• Authors: Sanhueza Rodríguez Sebastián
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Current philosophical debates about perception have largely ignored questions concerning the ontological structure of perceptual experience, so as to focus on its intentional and phenomenological character. To illustrate and put pressure on this tendency, I revisit the controversy between doxastic views of perception and Gareth Evans’s objection from over-intellectualization. I suggest that classic versions of the doxastic view are to a good extent driven by an ontological characterization of perceptual attitudes as non factive states or dispositions, not by a cognitively complex picture of perceptual content. Conceived along these lines, the doxastic view unveils an ontologically significant story of perceptual experience for at least two reasons: on the one hand, that characterization avoids the line of reasoning leading up to sense-datum theories of perception; and, on the other, it bears on recent discussions about the temporal structure of perceptual experience. Although I do not endorse the doxastic view, my goal is to highlight the importance of the relatively neglected ontological motivations thus driving that kind of account.

Keywords

EN

NON-FACTIVITY; PERCEPTUAL ATTITUDES; RELATIONALISM; REPRESENTATIONALISM

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 2 – 28

Contributors

author

Sanhueza Rodríguez Sebastián

• Faculty of Religious and Philosophical Studies and The Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neurosciences Research Centre, Catholic University of Maule, Avenida San Miguel 3605, Talca, Maule Region, Chile

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27101