MEZINÁRODNÍ VAZBY A VOLEBNÍ MANIPULACE V SOUTĚŽIVÝCH AUTORITÁŘSTVÍCH

• Authors: Bílek Jaroslav

Title variants

EN

International linkage and electoral manipulation in competitive authoritarian regimes

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

Scholars have highlighted the role of an international linkage in subversion and stability of contemporary competitive authoritarian regimes. But how does an international linkage affect autocrats during elections? Researchers have suggested that linkage to the West raises the cost of government abuse in competitive authoritarian regimes because it increases the probability of Western governments taking action in response to reported abuse. Conversely, linkage to the authoritarian regimes decreases the cost of repression and manipulation in competitive authoritarian regimes because autocratic sponsors like Russia or China could support its allies internationally. I test the aforementioned assumptions on time series, cross-national dataset with observations of 143 elections in competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2010. I did not find support for the first part of this argument. Extensive international relations to the West do not affect repression and manipulation. On the contrary, linkage to the authoritarian regimes increases the level of repression and manipulation in competitive authoritarian regimes.

Keywords

EN

ELECTORAL MANIPULATION; DEMOCRATIZATION; INTERNATIONAL LINKAGE; HYBRID REGIMES; COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM

• Publisher: Institute of Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Sociológia (Sociology)
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 5 – 25

Contributors

author

Bílek Jaroslav

• Filozofická fakulta, Univerzita Hradec Králové, nám. Svobody 331, 500 03 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/sociologia.2021.53.1.1