Zdravý rozum u Berkeleyho a Austina podle Marka Tomečka

• Authors: Jakub Mihálik

Title variants

EN

Common Sense in Berkeley and Austin according to Marek Tomeček

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

In this review study I investigate an interpretation of Berkeley’s concept of common sense which has been recently advanced by Marek Tomeček. In his view, Berkeley understands common sense as a collection of beliefs held by the common man. Common sense, however, has to remain implicit, and is thus an ineffable standard by which philosophical systems can be assessed. The missing argument for the implicitness of common sense is found by Tomeček in Austin. I make a case for the view that the interpretation presented would be more convincing if its author informed us why we should reject the interpretation of Petr Glombíček, according to which Berkeley understood common sense in traditional terms as rationality. Moreover, the argument for the implicitness of common sense, which Tomeček finds in Austin, is not convincing, as I attempt to show, because it is not clear why a speech act that is unsuccessful from the illocutionary point of view may not yet express a meaningful proposition.

Keywords

EN

common sense; immaterialism; George Berkeley; John Austin; speech act; propositional act; pragmatic theory of meaning

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 66
• Issue: 1
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Jakub Mihálik

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic