Předměty a nástroje reference: co ukazuje a co zakrývá Russellova teorie deskripcí

• Authors: Petr Koťátko

Title variants

EN

Objects and Instruments of Reference: What Russell’s Theory of Descriptions Shows and What it Conceals

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

Russell’s theory of descriptions has famously shown how a traditional epistemological position, consequently developed, imposes specific requirements on the logical analysis. Its result is, according to some Russellians, applicable not only to logical but also to communicative functions of sentences with definite descriptions as their components. This holds only under an apropriate explanation of the role played by Russellian propositions in communication. According to the author, they are introduced into communication as by-products of (successful or unsuccessful) acts of making singular statements and reflect the instrumental side of these acts. This “multipropositional” approach opens the possibility of combining the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences including descriptions with the Strawsonian analysis of the communicative function of these utterances, based on the notion of presuposition.

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 2, Special No: Studie k filosofii Bertranda Rusella
• Pages: 7-26
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Petr Koťátko

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic