A Chicago-School Island in the Ordo-liberal Sea? The Hungarian Competition Office’s Relaxed Treatment of Abuse of Dominance Cases

• Authors: Csongor István Nagy
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper presents and evaluates the impact of the 'more economic' approach of the Hungarian Competition Office’s decisional practice as to predatory pricing, margin squeeze and refusal to deal under Hungarian competition law. It compares the Hungarian practice with the more formalistic approach of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. The paper evaluates the Hungarian decisional practice in abuse cases and provides a brief assessment on the consequences of applying diverging standards in EU and national abuse of dominance law.

FR

Cet article présente et apprécie l’impact de l’approche plus économique (« more economic approach ») de l’Autorité hongroise de la concurrence en matière de prix d’éviction, compression des marges et refus de vente en droit hongrois. Il compare la pratique hongroise avec l’approche plus formaliste de la jurisprudence de la CJUE. L’article apprécie la pratique hongroise en matière d’abus de position dominante et rend la récapitulation des conséquences de l’application des règles divergentes en droit européen et national en matière d’abus.

Keywords

EN

Article 102 TFEU; dominant position; Hungarian competition law; margin squeeze; predatory pricing; price squeeze; refusal to deal

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 6(8)
• Pages: 54-74

Contributors

author

Csongor István Nagy

• University of Szeged

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