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2017 | 2(9) Security Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa | 101-120

Article title

SADC’S INTERVENTION AND RELAPSE IN MADAGASCAR’S POLITICAL CRISIS 2009-2014 AND THE REVEALED ROLE OF FRANCE?

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Abstracts

EN
This article is a reinterpretation of the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar between March 2009 and October 2014 plaguing the country into a political and security crisis. The chain of events had begun with the forced removal from power of the incumbent, President Marc Ravalomanana on 17 March 2009. Barely three days later, the leader of the civil society protest group, Andry Rajoelina, announcing that he had assumed power and the presidency. Almost immediately, the sub-regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during its Extraordinary Summit in Swaziland on 30th March 2009, invoked Article 30 of the July 2002, African Union (AU)’s Constitutive Act, suspending Madagascar’s membership and imposing sanctions until the constitutional order was restored. SADC’s mandate to intervene in order to maintain peace and security in any of the fifteen Member-States was provided under Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of the AU’s Constitutive Act. Adopting the position taken by SADC, imposing sanctions on the political developments that involved the military unconstitutional change of government, the AU, the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization of Francophonie States (OIF) and the United States also followed suit, effectively isolating the island state from continental and global, diplomatic, economic relations. However, what was not clear then was the role France had played behind the scenes in creating the crisis. Furthermore, it was not fully appreciated how Paris continued to influence and undermining the SADC intervention throughout the period of impasse. It was only at the end of the impasses, when Paris’ proxy and protégé was installed back in power that this became apparent. The common thread running through the French intervention was to dissuade SADC from adopting military measures to restore constitutional order. In achieving this constant, France had invited the United States to become complicit in propping up its foreign policy interests towards perpetuating its “le village Francafriquie” policy in Madagascar, Mayotte and Reunion.

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References

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Publication order reference

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bwmeta1.element.desklight-2f09aa3c-b625-48b9-9bd1-c4f112e934c0
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