Współzależności oportunistyczne interesariuszy w nadzorze korporacyjnym

• Authors: Stanisław Rudolf

Title variants

EN

Opportunism interdependencies of stakeholders in corporate governance

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The growing interest in the phenomenon of opportunism in the economy to a large extent is the result of the rapid development of the theory of transaction costs, which is among new institutional economics. In that mainstream economics the reduced opportunism has become the main way to increase the efficiency of business entities. New institutional economics sees individuals or organizations as what they are. It also recognizes their opportunistic behavior, particularly evident in an enterprise and its environment. The tendency to opportunism causes it must be taken into account both when entering into contracts and in their implementation, as well as during the preparation of the company’s strategy. The study discusses the broadly understood issue of opportunism in corporate governance. The subject of the consideration is not so much opportunistic attitudes of managers in relation to shareholders as opportunistic behaviour of the enterprise’s stakeholders. The analysis focuses on two aspects of the same phenomenon. Firstly, it concerns the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of such stakeholders as employees, shareholders, suppliers, customers, lenders, etc. Secondly, it refers to the risk of opportunism borne by stakeholders. The considerations show that stakeholders are opportunistically interdependent.

Keywords

EN

opportunism; corporate governance; company stakeholders

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
• Journal: Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu
• Year: 2013
• Issue: 4 (25)
• Pages: 260-272

Contributors

author

Stanisław Rudolf

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

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