Knowledge and opinion in Aristotle

• Authors: Jarosław Olesiak
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In the article I examine Aristotle’s distinction between knowledge and opinion. I first consider Aristotle’s notion of rational intuition in the light of the commentaries of Ross and Apostle. Next, I turn to the distinction between opinion and knowledge in Aristotle’s texts and in the commentaries of Aquinas and Barnes. I conclude that the distinction is complex, including a number of factors, some objective, others subjective. Aristotle believes that the object of knowledge must be objectively true and necessary; it must subjectively be seen as necessary; the true cause has to be known; and the necessity of the causal connection must be perceived. The most important criterion for knowledge is objective necessity. If any of the aforementioned criteria is not satisfied, there can according to him be at most true opinion.

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2011
• Issue: 27
• Pages: 170-184

Contributors

author

Jarosław Olesiak

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

References

• Apostle Hippocrates G., Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Grinnell, The Peripatetic Press, Iowa 1981.
• Aquinas Thomas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. Fabian R. Larcher, Magi Books, Inc., Albany, New York 1970.
• Barnes Jonathan, Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 2nd ed., The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993. Mure G.R.G., “Posterior Analytics”. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Random House, New York 1941.
• Ross William David, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1949.
• Tredennick Hugh, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1960.

Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.27.2011.432