EN
The Constitutional Tribunal recognizes some terms in the Constitution as so called “pre-existing notions”. That means that in case of absence of a clear defi nition of the notion within the Constitution, it may be assumed that the constitutional legislator intended this term to have the same meaning assigned to it by previous constitution, doctrine or legislation in force at the time of the entry of the 1997 Constitution. Such concept allows therefore to suppose that this notion has another (wider) meaning than a result of literal interpretation. The inspiration to write this article was judgment of 7th October 2013, K 31/12, wherein the issue of recognition the constitutional term “reading” of the bill as a pre-existing notion had decisive infl uence over the Tribunal’s decision. The article analyses the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding the pre-existing notions. The main aim is to answer the question, whether such idea can be treated as a complete, useful and established concept of constitutional interpretation. The analysis gives a positive answer.