The conceivability argument and the intuition of dualism

• Authors: Karol Polcyn
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Kripke’s antimaterialist argument, under David Papineau’s new interpretation, is not based on assuming that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility and does not lead to the conclusion that materialism is false but rather to the conclusion that we are all in the grip of the intuitive feeling that materialism is false. Leaving it open whether or not Papineau’s interpretation of Kripke’s argument is correct, I argue here that by appealing to the intuition of dualism we can see that the conceivability of zombies is not a reliable guide to possibility.

PL

Argument Kripkego przeciwko teorii identyczności nie jest, według Davida Papineau, oparty na założeniu, że wyobrażalność zombi implikuje możliwość i nie prowadzi do wniosku, że materializm jest fałszywy, a raczej do wniosku, że wszyscy mamy intuicyjne poczucie, że materializm jest fałszywy. Pozostawiając otwartą kwestię tego, czy interpretacja argumentu Kripkego zaoferowana przez Papineau jest słuszna, w niniejszej pracy dowodzę, że założenie o istnieniu intuicji dualizmu podważa tezę, że wyobrażalność zombi implikuje możliwość.

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2010
• Issue: 24
• Pages: 90-106

Contributors

author

Karol Polcyn

• Uniwersytet Szczeciński

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Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.24.2010.396