Aksjologiczna eksplikacja działań

• Authors: Löhrer Guido

Title variants

RU

Аксиологическая экспликация действия

EN

The Axiological Explication of Actions

• Languages of publication: PL
• Publisher: Stowarzyszenie Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich
• Journal: ΣΟΦΙΑ. Pismo Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich
• Year: 2015
• Issue: 15
• Pages: 307-324

Contributors

author

Löhrer Guido

• Universität Erfurt

translator

Szwed Iwona

• Uniwersytet Rzeszowski

translator

Kolbusz Magdalena

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.15584/sofia.2015.15.30