EN
The paper contains objections to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s semantic argumentagainst subjective idealism of George Berkeley, formulated in Ajdukiewicz’s articleEpistemology and Semiotics. It is argued that this argument is question-begging,as it presupposes a realistic conception of intentionality. It is analyzed whetherAjdukiewicz’s argument against idealism fromOn the Notion of Existencecould beused to support the former reasoning, and I argue that it could not. I also evaluateRoman Suszko’s modification of Ajdukiewicz argument and show that this modifi-cation is superficial, as it lays on the very same question-begging assumption thatAjdukiewicz made. In the conclusion I attempt a general defense of Ajdukiewicz’sphilosophical method, regardless of its misapplications.