To regulate or not to regulate? – Economic Approach to Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU)

• Authors: Magdalena Olender-Skorek
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree, the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network, IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects will probably fail.

FR

Le but de cet article est de présenter le droit irrévocable d’usage (IRU) comme un remède possible pour les projets d’infrastructure de télécommunications de l’UE qui, en Pologne, ont été lancés avec du retard. Grâce à l’IRU, les bénéficiaires de ces projets européens seront en mesure d’épargner à la fois le temps et l'argent pour terminer des projects avec succès. L'auteur décrit deux méthodes possibles de mise en œuvre de l'IRU: par l’obligation réglementaire et par le bias de bonne fois de l’opérateur historique. L'auteur propose un modèle de la théorie des jeux avec des gains qui dépendra de la stratégie choisie par le législateur et par l’opérateur historique. Par l'utilisation d'un arbre de la théorie des jeux, l'auteur montre que si seulement l’opérateur historique est prêt à offrir son propre réseau, l'IRU peut être signé, ce qui en effet aboutira à la disparition de la plupart des retards dans la mise en oeuvre des projets. Le succès n'est pas si évident dans le cas où la mise en œuvre de l'IRU est une obligation - là, les projets européens échoueront probablement.

Keywords

EN

Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU); long-term agreement; third party access; telecom market; entry barriers; infrastructure owner; entrants; infrastructure; EU projects

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 5(7)
• Pages: 143-155

Dates

published

2012-11-30

Contributors

author

Magdalena Olender-Skorek

• Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw

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