Ekonomia kosztów transakcyjnych: naturalne etapy rozwoju

• Authors: Williamson Oliver E.

Title variants

EN

Transaction cost economics: The natural progression

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Program badawczy, w którym uczestniczę wraz innymi przedstawicielami świata nauki, bywa nazywany ekonomią zarządzania, ekonomią organizacji lub ekonomią kosztów transakcyjnych. W części pierwszej wyjaśniam, że rządzenie (governance) stanowi koncepcję nadrzędną, natomiast ekonomia kosztów transakcyjnych jest środkiem, za pomocą którego można zoperacjonalizować pojęcie organizacji. Do uczestnictwa w badaniach w tej dziedzinie zainspirowało mnie pytanie sformułowane po raz pierwszy przez Ronalda Coase’a w 1937 r.: jakie czynniki decydują o tym, kiedy firma produkuje dany towar lub usługę we własnym zakresie, a kiedy nabywa je od niezależnych jednostek funkcjonujących na rynku? W części drugiej nawiązuję do swojego artykułu zatytułowanego „The Vertical Integration of Production” [Pionowa integracja produkcji]. Od chwili jego publikacji w 1971 r. dokonałem w tym obszarze pewnych postępów i zachęciłem innych naukowców do badań, które w pewnej chwili zaczęto nazywać ekonomią kosztów transakcyjnych. Podstawy ekonomii kosztów transakcyjnych przedstawiam w rozdziale trzecim. Zagadki i wyzwania, które wymagały „doprowadzenia do końca logiki efektywnego rządzenia” przedstawiam krótko w części czwartej. Wystąpienie kończy się krótkimi wnioskami.

EN

The research program on which I and others have been working has been variously described as the “economics of governance,” the “economics of organization,” and “transaction cost economics.” As discussed in Section 1, governance is the overarching concept and transaction cost economics is the means by which to breathe operational content into governance and organization. The specific issue that drew me into this research project was the puzzle posed by Ronald Coase in 1937: What efficiency factors determine when a firm produces a good or service to its own needs rather than outsource? As described in Section 2, my 1971 paper on “The Vertical Integration of Production” made headway with this issue and invited follow-on research that would eventually come to be referred to as transaction cost economics. The rudiments of transaction cost economics are set out in Section 3. Puzzles and challenges that arose and would require “pushing the logic of efficient governance to completion” are examined briefly in Section 4. Concluding remarks follow.

Keywords

PL

koszty transakcyjne; pionowa integracja produkcji; outsourcing; kontrakty; alokacja zasobów

EN

transaction costs; vertical integration of production; outsourcing; contracts; allocation of resources

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej
• Journal: Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance
• Year: 2015
• Issue: 2(32)
• Pages: 67-90

Contributors

author

Williamson Oliver E.

• University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

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Identifiers

DOI

10.15678/ZP.2015.32.2.06