Pokryzysowe regulacje w zakresie systemowo ważnych banków. Koniec problemu TBTF?

• Authors: Dobrzańska Anna , Michalewicz Jarosław

Title variants

EN

Post-crisis Regulations of Systemically Important Banks. The End of the “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine?

Abstracts

Globalny kryzys finansowy zmusił organy publiczne odpowiedzialne za działanie na rzecz stabilności finansowej do zajęcia się problemem „instytucji zbyt dużych, by upaść”. Pokryzysowe reformy dotyczące systemowo banków mają zasadniczo dwa cele. Pierwszym jest zwiększenie zdolności takich instytucji do absorbcji strat. Drugim celem jest zapewnianie mechanizmów i narzędzi, które umożliwią organom publicznym przeprowadzenie uporządkowanej restrukturyzacji systemowych banków, gdy dalsza działalność tych instytucji będzie zagrożona, przy jednoczesnym ograniczeniu negatywnych konsekwencji dla stabilności systemu finansowego oraz gospodarki realnej. Intencję niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie i ocena dotychczasowych zmian regulacyjnych w zakresie banków systemowo ważnych. Podjęto tu próbę zdefiniowania takich instytucji, wskazując główne kryteria wpływające na ich systemowe znaczenie, oraz wskazano przyczyny, dla których generują one ryzyko systemowe. Główne rozważania skoncentrowano na analizie kluczowych refom, tj. na obowiązku utrzymywania dodatkowych buforów kapitałowych, procedurze uporządkowanej restrukturyzacji oraz wymogach w zakresie TLAC.

EN

The global financial crisis forced public authorities responsible for maintaining financial stability to resolve the issue of too big to fail institutions. Post-crisis reforms directed at systemically important banks have basically two objectives. The first goal is to increase loss-absorbing capacity of such institutions. The second aim is to ensure mechanisms and tools which will enable the public authorities to conduct orderly resolution of systemically important banks when their viability is threatened, while constraining negative consequences for stability of the financial system and the real economy. The purpose of this article is to present and assess regulatory actions taken to address problems related to systemically important banks. The article tries to define such institutions indicating the main criteria which determine their systemic importance. It also indicates reasons for which such institutions create systemic risk. The main analysis is focused on the key reforms, i.e. the additional capital buffers, the orderly resolution and the TLAC requirements.

Keywords

PL

systemowo ważne banki; G-SIBs; „zbyt duże, by upaść”; bufory kapitałowe; uporządkowana restrukturyzacja; TLAC; Bazylea III

EN

systemically important banks; G-SIBs; “too big to fail”; capital buffers; resolution; TLAC; Basel III

• Publisher: Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny
• Journal: Bezpieczny Bank
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 1 (66)
• Pages: 32-59

Contributors

author

Dobrzańska Anna

• narodowy Bank Polski

author

Michalewicz Jarosław

• Narodowy Bank Polski

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