Ograniczenia planowania : powstawanie instytucji i zmiany instytucjonalne

• Authors: Pierson Paul

Title variants

EN

The Limits of Design : Explaining Institutional Origins and Change

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Jak dotąd politolodzy zwracali o wiele większą uwagę na efekty działania instytucji niż na kwestie związane z ich genezą i zachodzącymi w nich zmianami. W rezultacie można zaobserwować tendencję do opierania się na modelach otwarcie lub domyślnie nawiązujących do funkcjonalizmu, czyli takich, które uzasadniają obecność danych instytucji poprzez skutki ich działań. Efekty te rzeczywiście mogą stanowić część takiego wyjaśnienia, jednak to, w jakim stopniu podejście funkcjonalne odzwierciedla rzeczywistość, zależy od istnienia szeregu sprzyjających warunków na etapie planowania lub obecności środowisk wymuszających uczenie się bądź konkurencję. Analizując zmienność w odpowiednich kontekstach społecznych, można ograniczyć wachlarz dostępnych modeli funkcjonalnych, a także wytyczyć pewne obiecujące kierunki badań nad genezą instytucji i zmian, którym ulegały.

EN

Political scientists have paid much more attention to the eff ects of institutions than to issues of institutional origins and change. One result has been a marked tendency to fall back on implicit or explicit functional accounts, in which the eff ects of institutions explain the presence of those institutions. Institutional eff ects may indeed provide part of such an explanation. Yet the plausibility of functional accounts depends upon either a set of favorable conditions at the design stage or the presence of environments conducive to learning or competition. Exploring variability in the relevant social contexts makes it possible to both establish the restricted range of functional accounts and specify some promising lines of inquiry into the subject of institutional origins and change.

Keywords

PL

rządzenie; analiza instytucjonalna; planowanie instytucji; sieci polityczne

EN

governance; institutional analysis; institutional design; policy networks

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej
• Journal: Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance
• Year: 2010
• Issue: 2(12)
• Pages: 112-131

Contributors

author

Pierson Paul

• Harvard University, USA

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