What does Kripke mean by "a priori?"

• Authors: Pierre Baumann
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper argues that Kripke's claim that there are contingent a priori truths would be vitiated by a seemingly unorthodox understanding of the term "a priori".

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2011
• Issue: 28
• Pages: 1-7

Contributors

author

Pierre Baumann

• University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras

References

• Ayer [1946] – A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, Dover, New York 1946.
• Devitt [2005] – M. Devitt, There is no a priori, [in:] Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.), Blackwell, Cambridge, MA 2005: 105-115.
• Hale [1987] – B. Hale, Abstract Objects, Blackwell, Oxford 1987.
• Hughes [2004] – C. Hughes, Kripke, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
• Kant [1781/2003] – I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. Kemp Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills 1781/2003.
• Kripke [1980] – S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford 1980.
• Salmon [1988] – N. Salmon, How to measure the standard metre, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (88) 1988: 193-217.
• Wittgenstein [1953] – L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 1953.

Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.28.2011.433