EN
Traditional interpretations of the Kantian idea of autonomy, based on classical texts such as Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, stress mainly one point: action is autonomous only when the agent obeys the law. In this paper I try to introduce an interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy which covers a broader perspective and presents the idea of “radical autonomy”. By reading Kant’s classical practical texts in connection with Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft and Tugendlehre, it is possible to show that Kant’s conception of autonomy also allows for actions (and maxims) that are not determined by the categorical imperative. This paper adopts the point of view of “historical enlightenment” (Schnädelbach), which is rather contrary to the general anti-historical context of Kant’s philosophy. It causes interpretation to be methodologically against Kantian the “metaphysical hipotheque” (e.g., the pure Faktum der Vernunft, the absolute grounding of morality); however, a broadened idea of (“radical”) autonomy also makes it possible to defend Kant’s ethics in the contemporary critical horizon of historicism.