The motivation of business leaders in socialist and market-based systems (An essay to celebrate the 90th birthday of János Kornai)

• Authors: Mihályi Peter
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Janos Kornai was well ahead of mainstream economic thought in comprehending that senior executives have been operating in an intrinsically contradictory situation both in socialist and market-based economies and that there is no full remedy to handle conflicts of interest which arise. Kornai presented a comprehensive theory on this in his most important book, the Anti-Equilibrium, as early as 1971. The difficulties experienced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were not rooted merely in the socialist ownership form, but they were, to a significant extent, caused by the fact that SOEs were typically very large firms.

Keywords

EN

comparative systems; corporate governance; principal-agent theory

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
• Journal: Economics and Business Review
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 3(17)
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 100-111

Dates

published

2017-09-30

Contributors

author

Mihályi Peter

• Corvinus University of Budapest, Corvinus School of Economics, Department of Macroeconomics, H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8, Hungary

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18559/ebr.2017.3.6