Zapiski o teorii zarządzania wielopoziomowego w Europie

• Authors: Scharpf Fritz W.

Title variants

EN

Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Złożoności wielopoziomowej polityki europejskiej w żaden sposób nie oddaje jakikolwiek jednowarstwowy koncept teoretyczny odnoszący się do konkurujących między sobą tendencji międzypaństwowych lub ponadnarodowych. Wręcz przeciwnie, badania empiryczne dotyczące interakcji wielopoziomowych wydają się akcentować unikatowość tego zjawiska lub kreować nowe koncepcje, które najprawdopodobniej staną się przedmiotem sporów, nawet wśród europeistów, a następnie odizolują studia europejskie od innych głównych nurtów badawczych w obszarze nauk politycznych, przede wszystkim do stosunków międzynarodowych i polityki porównawczej. Trudności tego typu utrwalą się, w sytuacji gdy znawcy tematu będą podtrzymywać swoje propozycje holistycznej koncepcji całościowo ogarniającej kompleksowość i z jej pomocą objaśniać polityki europejskiej. Sugeruje się nawet, że można wyeliminować obecne konkurowanie między sobą mało ugruntowanych i kontrowersyjnych twierdzeń uogólniających, jeśli studia europejskie zrobią użytek z mnogości prostszych koncepcji lub teorii uzupełniających, z których każda ukaże specyficzną charakterystykę lub pewien fragment interakcji wielopoziomowych – który z kolei można dostosować do innych obszarów badawczych w naukach politycznych. W artykule przedstawiono cztery modele interakcji wielopoziomowej w polityce europejskiej – „wzajemne dostosowanie”, „negocjacje międzypaństwowe”, „współdecydowanie” oraz „ukierunkowanie hierarchiczne” – oraz ukazano cechy tych modeli w odniesieniu do kryteriów zdolności rozwiązywania problemów oraz legitymizacji instytucjonalnej.

EN

The complexity of the multi-level European polity is not adequately represented by the single-level theoretical concepts of competing “intergovernmentalist” and “supranationalist” approaches. By contrast, empirical research focusing on multilevel interactions tends either to emphasize the uniqueness of its objects, or to create novel concepts – which are likely to remain contested even among Europeanists and have the effect of isolating European studies from the political science mainstream in International Relations and Comparative Politics. These difficulties are bound to continue as long as researchers keep proposing holistic concepts that claim to represent the complex reality of the European polity as a whole. It is suggested that the present competition among poorly fitting and contested generalizations could be overcome if European studies made use of a plurality of simpler and complementary concepts, each of which is meant to represent the specific characteristics of certain subsets of multi-level interactions – which could also be applied and tested in other fields of political-science research. The paper goes on to describe four distinct modes of multi-level interaction in the European polity – “mutual adjustment”, “intergovernmental negotiations”, “joint-decision making”, and “hierarchical direction” – and to discuss their characteristics by reference to the criteria of problem-solving capacity and institutional legitimacy.

Keywords

PL

zarządzanie wielopoziomowe; wzajemne dostosowanie; negocjacje międzypaństwowe; współdecydowanie; Unia Europejska

EN

multilevel governance; mutual adjustment; intergovernmental negotiations; joint-decision making; hierarchical direction; European Union

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej
• Journal: Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 4(30)
• Pages: 76-99

Contributors

author

Scharpf Fritz W.

• Instytut Badań nad Społeczeństwem im. Maxa Plancka

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7366/1898352943005